In 1904 Stanley Baldwin was selected for the Conservative safe seat of Kidderminster. However, in the 1906 General Election, the Liberal Party achieved a landslide victory and lost the seat to Edmund Broughton Barnard. In 1908 his father died and he inherited nearly £200,000 (£15 million in today's money) and was offered his parliamentary seat of Bewdley. After an unopposed return was introduced into the House of Commons on 3rd March 1908. (11)

In his maiden speech he used his own business experience to explain his views on trade unions: "I might mention, not as of any interest to the House, but merely as showing what the House might expect of me in the way of fair debate, that although my family had been engaged for 130 years in trade, the disputes they had had with their men could be numbered on the fingers of one hand. I myself have been in active business for twenty years, and have never had the shadow of a dispute with any of my own men, and I gave my men in the sheet-rolling trade an eight-hour day long before the question excited any interest in the House or the country. (12)

Baldwin's first biographer, Adam Gowans Whyte, attempted to explain why he entered politics so late in life: "Experience in manufacturing and in trade is a valuable asset to a politician, but distinguished success in these spheres leaves a man little enough time for the duties of an ordinary member of the House of Commons. Moreover, the qualities which make for high achievement in the factory or counting-house are not identical with those which must be cultivated by the leader of a party or a popular statesman... In the case of Mr. Baldwin, there was also a transition from business to politics, but it was of a less deliberate and drastic character. He may be said to have inherited the double strain of industry and public service, since he succeeded both to his father's business and to his father's seat in the House of Commons." (13)

Baldwin held progressive political ideas and was one of twelve Conservative MPs who voted for the second reading of the Old Age Pensions Act in 1908, and he approved the principle of the National Insurance Act. However, he only made only five speeches in his first six years. One of these was over the issue of "unfair competition of foreign producers in British markets, and in the high tariffs of foreign countries, has caused capital to be employed abroad which might have been used at home to the great advantage of the wage-earning population of the country." (14)

On the outbreak of the First World War he was forty-seven, and too old for military service. He encouraged his own workers to join the armed forces by paying out of his own pocket, the Friendly Society subscriptions. Arthur Bonar Law, appointed Baldwin as his parliamentary private secretary, and by late 1916 he gave his support to David Lloyd George in his plot to overthrow H. H. Asquith, the prime minister. (15)

Lloyd George brought Baldwin into his government as Financial Secretary to the Treasury and President of the Board of Trade. He was a few weeks short of his fiftieth birthday, a somewhat elderly junior minister. He held the post for the next four years. He served under two Chancellors, Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain. He admired rather than liked Lloyd George. He would often have breakfast with the prime minister and wrote: "The breakfasts give me a good opportunity of studying that strange little genius who presides over us. He is an extraordinary compound." (16)

Baldwin became very attached to Joan (Mimi) Dickinson, the 18-year-old friend of one of his daughters. In April 1918 he introduced her to John C. Davidson, one of junior aides. Davidson later recalled: "I was very shy and reluctant to take part in it at all and I thought it was terrible to be wasting time. When I reached the drawing room, I looked around and saw standing on the stairs a girl talking to SB (Stanley Baldwin). I went up to them and he introduced me. And I said to myself then and there, this is the girl I am going to marry. I asked her for a dance and she accepted.... I was invited to stay at Astley with the Baldwins and Mimi was there. I proposed to her and she turned me down. In fact, she turned me down pretty regularly until at long last, on New Year's Eve, 1918... We went back to Portland Place where my parents lived and then to Egerton Gardens where her parents were living and announced our engagement." (16a)

Her mother had doubts about Mimi's choice of a husband. Baldwin decided to write her a letter: "Mimi has chosen a partner of the right age. She might have married a man of fifty or a boy of twenty. You are spared that. They start equal: with the outlook of the same generation, with the prospect of passing their youth together, of entering middle life and old age together. Then - and for this a father and mother should thank God daily - you are giving your child to a man with a mind as clean as the north wind, whose whole life's attitude towards women makes him worthy of the trust you are placing in him... There is no need of anxiety, believe me. I know them both and love them both, and I believe that in a few years you will look back and bless this day, and, who knows, you may even have a kind word for the man who first brought them together!" (16b)

The couple married on 9th April 1919. Joan was the younger daughter and second of three children of Willoughby Hyett Dickinson, barrister and Liberal MP, and his wife, Minnie Elizabeth Gordon Cumming, daughter of General Richard John Meade. It was a close and happy marriage and resulted in two sons and two daughters (Margaret, Jean, Andrew and Malcolm). Baldwin remained a close friend of Mimi's and he wrote on average three times a week for twenty-five years to her. (16c)

Baldwin's company continued to grow and it is estimated that his fortune had reached £600,000 ((£45 million in today's money). "He enjoyed cricket in the summer and mixed hockey matches in the winter. He was a great walker... The Baldwins lived modestly... He disliked ostentation and high living. It was perhaps part of the puritan inheritance from his ancestors that he preferred to spend his money on charity rather than on the adornment of his house or the provisioning of his table." (17) As one of his biographers pointed out, he had discovered that "goodwill was no alternative to taxation". (18)

Baldwin was embarrassed by the huge profits made by his company during the First World War and in June, 1919, Baldwin had an anonymous letter to The Times where he appealed to the "wealthy classes" to help deal with the national debt. "I have made as accurate an estimate as I am able of the value of my own estate, and have arrived at a total of about £580,000. I have decided to realise 20% of that amount or say £120,000 which will purchase £150,000 of the War Loan, and present it to the Government for cancellation. I give this portion of my estate as a thank-offering in the firm conviction that never again shall we have such a chance of giving our country that form of help which is so vital at the present time." (19)

As one biographer pointed out: "The gesture was generous and public spirited, with an element of naïveté about it. The anonymity (not perhaps best protected by the choice of pseudonym) held just long enough for Baldwin to be alone in the secret amongst those present when he performed his statutory Financial Secretary's duty of witnessing the burning of the cancelled bonds, but not for much longer. And the attempt to start an avalanche of donations was a complete failure. Baldwin had aimed by his example at a debt reduction of £1,000 million. In the result only about £1½ million, including his own gift, was received." (20)

Baldwin found politics very frustrating and in 1921 stated that "many times in the life of anyone who is working in Parliament and in the Government, and in times like these, one feels that one would like to throw the whole thing up, get out of the country, and never come back again." In another speech he said that he was looking forward to retirement so he could devote himself to the things he enjoyed: "I look forward to the time when I can pick up the books in my library that are now covered with dust, which I never have time to look at, when I can devote myself to studies and to delights of that kind from which I have been too long alienated." (21)

In March 1921 Baldwin was promoted to be President of the Board of Trade and joined the Lloyd George Coalition Cabinet. The prime minister gradually lost the support of his Cabinet colleagues. After Edwin Montagu resigned in March 1922, he criticised the style of Lloyd George's leadership: "We have been governed by a great genius - a dictator who has called together from time to time conferences of Ministers, men who had access to him day and night, leaving all those who, like myself, found it impossible to get him for days together. He has come to epoch-making decisions, over and over again. It is notorious that members of the Cabinet had no knowledge of those decisions." (22)

Stanley and Lucy Baldwin often went on holiday to Aix-les-Bains with the much younger, John C. Davidson and Joan Davidson. Lucy Baldwin, did not share her husband's "intellectual or aesthetic tastes, and did not accompany him on the long walks which were a staple part of his recreation in Worcestershire or at Aix... and she allowed others, notably Mrs Davidson to take the walks." (22a)

John Davidson later wrote: "The Baldwins were regular visitors to Aix-les-Bains, and Mimi and I often joined them there. We used to walk with him while Mrs Baldwin took the baths... It is not easy to describe adequately the splendor of the scenery of Aix-les-Bains. The outline in the morning or the evening of Le Col du Chat and the stiff but marvellous walk along the escarpment are both never-to-be-forgotten memories... It gave such relaxation to SB (Baldwin), and constituted an essential contrast with the heat and burden of politics at home." (22b)

John C. Davidson entered the House of Commons as MP for Hemel Hempstead in November 1920. Davidson, who was a close friend of Andrew Bonar Law, became his parliamentary private secretary (PPS). When Law retired on health grounds in March 1921, Davidson became parliamentary private secretary to Stanley Baldwin. "Davidson shared with Baldwin and a range of junior ministers an increasingly negative view of the Lloyd George coalition. The revolt against this was a movement at many levels within the Conservative Party involving constituency pressure, back-bench MPs, junior ministers, and restive peers." (22c)

In August 1922 Lloyd George had to defend himself from the charge of profiteering from the First World War when The Evening Standard revealed that a United States publisher had offered £90,000 for the American rights to his memoirs. (23) It was claimed that he was going to make a fortune out of a conflict in which so many men had died. The public outcry far exceeded the expressions of distaste which were provoked by the honours scandal. After two weeks of hostile newspaper articles, Lloyd George made a statement that the money would be "devoted to charities connected with the relief of suffering caused by the war." (24)

Baldwin became convinced that Lloyd George was a corrupt politician who had sold appointments. He was also concerned that he was "casually destroying working class confidence in government by abandoning social reform, fudging the question of nationalising the coal mines and bodging compromises to end industrial disputes, all decisions that could only strengthen Labour's appeal." (25)

At a meeting on 14th October, 1922, Stanley Baldwin and Leo Amery, urged the Conservative Party to remove Lloyd George from power. Andrew Bonar Law disagreed as he believed that he should remain loyal to the Prime Minister. In the next few days Bonar Law was visited by a series of influential Tories - all of whom pleaded with him to break with Lloyd George. This message was reinforced by the result of the Newport by-election where the independent Conservative won with a majority of 2,000, the coalition Conservative came in a bad third. (26)

Another meeting took place on 18th October. Austen Chamberlain and Arthur Balfour both defended the coalition. However, it was a passionate speech by Baldwin: "The Prime Minister was described this morning in The Times, in the words of a distinguished aristocrat, as a live wire. He was described to me and others in more stately language by the Lord Chancellor as a dynamic force. I accept those words. He is a dynamic force and it is from that very fact that our troubles, in our opinion, arise. A dynamic force is a terrible thing. It may crush you but it is not necessarily right." (27)

J. C. C. Davidson commented: "The speeches which I remember best were of course Baldwin's and Bonar's. Balfour's was most inappropriate to the feeling at the meeting and Austen Chamberlain's was a lecture. Austen made quite a good speech from his point of view, but it was really idolatry, because it was a speech indicating that the only man who could really lead the country was the man who practically the whole of our party, especially the rebelling element in it, regarded as the most evil genius in the country, and who Baldwin subsequently described brilliantly as a dynamic force." As a result of the debate the motion to withdraw from the coalition was carried by 185 votes to 88. (27a)

David Lloyd George was forced to resign and his party only won 127 seats in the 1922 General Election. The Conservative Party won 344 seats and formed the next government under Andrew Bonar Law. The Labour Party promised to nationalise the mines and railways, a massive house building programme and to revise the peace treaties, went from 57 to 142 seats, whereas the Liberal Party increased their vote and went from 36 to 62 seats. (28)

Andrew Bonar Law, the leader of the Conservative Party, replaced David Lloyd George as prime minister. Baldwin was rewarded for his role in bringing down Lloyd George by becoming Chancellor of the Exchequer. Bonar Law's first task was to persuade the French government to be more understanding of Germany's ability to pay war reparations. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), agreed to 226 billion gold marks. In 1921, the amount was reduced to 132 billion. However, they were still unable to pay the full amount and by the end of 1922, Germany was deeply in debt. Bonar Law suggested lowering the payments but the French refused and on 11th January, 1923, the French Army occupied the Ruhr. (29)

Bonar Law also had the problem of Britain's war debt to the United States. In January 1923, Baldwin, sailed to America to discuss a settlement. Initially the loans to Britain had been made at an interest rate of 5 per cent. Bonar Law urged Baldwin to get it reduced to 2.5 per cent, but the best American offer was for 3 per cent, rising to 3.5 per cent after ten years. This amounted to annual repayments of £25 million and £36 million, rising to £40 million. Baldwin, acting on his own initiative, accepted the American offer and announced to the British press that they were the best terms available. Bonar Law was furious and on 30th January announced at cabinet that he would resign rather than accept the settlement. However, the rest of the cabinet thought it was a good deal and he was forced to withdraw his threat. (30)

The American settlement meant a 4 per cent increase in public expenditure at a time when Bonar Law was committed to a policy of reducing taxes and public expenditure. This brought him into conflict with the trade union movement that was deeply concerned by growing unemployment. Robert Blake, the author of The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (1970) argued that Bonar Law was not sure how the working class would react to this situation. Could they gain their support "by making moderate concessions" or to make "a direct appeal to the working-class over the heads of the bourgeoisie, a new form of Tory radicalism?" (31)

In the House of Commons he argued the case for the Conservative Party to move to the left. "I am myself of that somewhat flabby nature that always prefers agreement to disagreement...When the Labour Party sit on these benches, we shall all wish them well in their effort to govern the country. But I am quite certain that whether they succeed or fail there will never in this country be a Communist Government, and for this reason, that no gospel founded on hate will ever seize the hearts of our people - the people of Great Britain... No Government in this country today, which has not faith in the people, hope in the future, love for his fellow-men, and which will not work and work and work, will ever bring this country through into better days and better times, or will ever bring Europe through or the world through." (32)

In April 1923, Bonar Law began to have problems talking. On the advice of his doctor, Sir Thomas Horder, he took a month's break from work, leaving Lord George Curzon to preside over the cabinet and Stanley Baldwin to lead in the House of Commons. Horder examined Bonar Law in Paris on 17th May, and diagnosed him to be suffering from cancer of the throat, and gave him six months to live. Five days later Bonar Law resigned but decided against nominating a successor. (33)

J. C. C. Davidson, the Conservative Party MP, sent a memorandum to King George V advising him on the appointment: "The resignation of the Prime Minister makes it necessary for the Crown to exercise its prerogative in the choice of Mr Bonar Law's successor. There appear to be only two possible alternatives. Mr Stanley Baldwin and Lord Curzon. The case for each is very strong. Lord Curzon has, during a long life, held high office almost continuously and is therefore possessed of wide experience of government. His industry and mental equipment are of the highest order. His grasp of the international situation is great."

Davidson pointed out that Baldwin also had certain advantages: "Stanley Baldwin has had a very rapid promotion and has by his gathering strength exceeded the expectations of his most fervent friends. He is much liked by all shades of political opinion in the House of Commons, and has the complete confidence of the City and the commercial world generally. He in fact typifies the spirit of the Government which the people of this country elected last autumn and also the same characteristics which won the people's confidence in Mr Bonar Law, i.e. honesty, simplicity and balance."

Given their relative merits, Davidson believed that the king should select Baldwin: "Lord Curzon temperamentally does not inspire complete confidence in his colleagues, either as to his judgement or as to his ultimate strength of purpose in a crisis. His methods too are inappropriate to harmony. The prospect of him receiving deputations as Prime Minister for the Miners' Federation or the Triple Alliance, for example, is capable of causing alarm for the future relations between the Government and labour, between moderate and less moderate opinion... The time, in the opinion of many members of the House of Commons, has passed when the direction of domestic policy can be placed outside the House of Commons, and it is admitted that although foreign and imperial affairs are of vital importance, stability at home must be the basic consideration. There is also the fact that Lord Curzon is regarded in the public eye as representing that section of privileged conservatism which has its value, but which in this democratic age cannot be too assiduously exploited." (34)

Arthur Balfour, the prime minister between July, 1902 and December, 1905, was also consulted and he suggested the king could chose Baldwin. (35) "Balfour... pointed out that a Cabinet already over-weighted with peers would be open to even greater criticism if one of them actually became Prime Minister; that, since the Parliament Act of 1911, the political centre of gravity had moved more definitely than ever to the Lower House; and finally that the official Opposition, the Labour party, was not represented at all in the House of Lords." (36)

Stanley Baldwin became prime minister on 22nd May, 1923. He told the House of Commons: "I never sought the office. I never planned out or schemed my life. I have but one idea, which was an idea that I inherited, and it was the idea of service - service to the people of this country. My father lived in the belief all his life… It is a tradition; it is in our bones; and we have to do it. That service seemed to lead one by way of business and the county council into Parliament, and it has led one through various strange paths to where one is; but the ideal remains the same, because all my life I believed from my heart the words of Browning, 'All service ranks the same with God'. It makes very little difference whether a man is driving a tramcar or sweeping streets or being Prime Minister, if he only brings to that service everything that is in him and performs it for the sake of mankind." (37)

Baldwin was faced with growing economic problems. This included a high-level of unemployment. Baldwin believed that protectionist tariffs would revive industry and employment. However, Bonar Law had pledged in 1922 that there would be no changes in tariffs in the present parliament. Baldwin came to the conclusion that he needed a General Election to unite his party behind this new policy. On 12th November, Baldwin asked the king to dissolve parliament. (38)

During the election campaign, Baldwin made it clear that he intended to impose tariffs on some imported goods: "What we propose to do for the assistance of employment in industry, if the nation approves, is to impose duties on imported manufactured goods, with the following objects: (i) to raise revenue by methods less unfair to our own home production which at present bears the whole burden of local and national taxation, including the cost of relieving unemployment; (ii) to give special assistance to industries which are suffering under unfair foreign competition; (iii) to utilise these duties in order to negotiate for a reduction of foreign tariffs in those directions which would most benefit our export trade; (iv) to give substantial preference to the Empire on the whole range of our duties with a view to promoting the continued extension of the principle of mutual preference which has already done so much for the expansion of our trade, and the development, in co-operation with the other Governments of the Empire, of the boundless resources of our common heritage." (39)

The Labour Party election manifesto completely rejected this argument: "The Labour Party challenges the Tariff policy and the whole conception of economic relations underlying it. Tariffs are not a remedy for Unemployment. They are an impediment to the free interchange of goods and services upon which civilised society rests. They foster a spirit of profiteering, materialism and selfishness, poison the life of nations, lead to corruption in politics, promote trusts and monopolies, and impoverish the people. They perpetuate inequalities in the distribution of the world's wealth won by the labour of hands and brain. These inequalities the Labour Party means to remove." (40)

In the 1923 General Election, the Labour Party won 191 seats. Although the Conservative Party had 258 seats, Herbert Asquith announced that the Liberal Party would not keep the Tories in office. If a Labour Government were ever to be tried in Britain, he declared, "it could hardly be tried under safer conditions". On 22nd January, 1924 Stanley Baldwin resigned. At midday, the 57 year-old, Ramsay MacDonald went to Buckingham Palace to be appointed prime minister. He later recalled how George V complained about the singing of the Red Flag and the La Marseilles, at the Labour Party meeting in the Albert Hall a few days before. MacDonald apologized but claimed that there would have been a riot if he had tried to stop it. (41)

Stanley Baldwin remained close to John C. Davidson and Joan Davidson. He wrote in December, 1923: "This is a time for hanging out signals to our friends. How can I tell you what you have been to me for yet another year? Life has nothing more precious than your friendship and I bless you for it every day. You will never how you help me and what have I done that I should have that amazing friendship that you and David give me, I know not. But I am grateful for it. And this is true, that the love that binds us three together makes it easier to generate that wider love that alone makes it possible to carry on in public life." (41a)

Baldwin made a speech on 3rd May, 1924, where he commented on the changes that were taking place in politics: "The government had no mandate to govern, and its members won their seats as a Socialistic vote, but were not carving out a Socialist policy. This could be only temporary. If words meant anything the Labour Party was a Socialist Party, and if they went back on socialism they were little more than a left wing of the Conservative Party. Socialism had certain obvious advantages, possessing cut and dried remedies for every evil under the sun, but Conservatives have been in the fore-front of the battle to help the people more… If we are to live as a party we must live for the people in the widest sense… Every future Government must be Socialistic." (42)

On 10th October 1924, MI5 received a copy of a letter, dated 15th September, sent by Grigory Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern in the Soviet Union, to Arthur McManus, the British representative on the committee. In the letter British communists were asked to take all possible action to ensure the ratification of the Anglo-Soviet Treaties. It then went on to advocate preparation for military insurrection in working-class areas of Britain and for subverting the allegiance in the army and navy. (43)

Hugh Sinclair, head of MI6, provided "five very good reasons" why he believed the letter was genuine. However, one of these reasons, that the letter came "direct from an agent in Moscow for a long time in our service, and of proved reliability" was incorrect. (44) Vernon Kell, the head of MI5 and Sir Basil Thomson the head of Special Branch, were also convinced that the Zinoviev Letter was genuine. Desmond Morton, who worked for MI6, told Sir Eyre Crowe, at the Foreign Office, that an agent, Jim Finney, who worked for George Makgill, the head of the Industrial Intelligence Bureau (IIB), had penetrated Comintern and the Communist Party of Great Britain. Morton told Crowe that Finney "had reported that a recent meeting of the Party Central Committee had considered a letter from Moscow whose instructions corresponded to those in the Zinoviev letter". However, Christopher Andrew, who examined all the files concerning the matter, claims that Finney's report of the meeting does not include this information. (45)

Kell showed the letter to Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour Prime Minister. It was agreed that the letter should be kept secret until it was discovered to be genuine. (46) Thomas Marlowe, who worked for the press baron, Alfred Harmsworth, Lord Rothermere, had a good relationship with Reginald Hall, the Conservative Party MP, for Liverpool West Derby. During the First World War he was director of Naval Intelligence Division of the Royal Navy (NID) and he leaked the letter to Marlowe, in an effort to bring an end to the Labour government. (47)

The newspaper now contacted the Foreign Office and asked if it was a forgery. Without reference to MacDonald, a senior official told Marlowe it was genuine. The newspaper also received a copy of the letter of protest sent by the British government to the Russian ambassador, denouncing it as a "flagrant breach of undertakings given by the Soviet Government in the course of the negotiations for the Anglo-Soviet Treaties". It was decided not to use this information until closer to the election. (48)

David Lloyd George signed a trade agreement with Russia in 1921, but never recognised the Soviet government. On taking office the Labour government entered into talks with Russian officials and eventually recognised the Soviet Union as the de jure government of Russia, in return for the promise that Britain would get payment of money that Tsar Nicholas II had borrowed when he had been in power. (49)

A conference was held in London to discuss these matters. Most newspapers reacted with hostility to these negotiations and warned of the danger of dealing with what they considered to be an "evil regime". in August 1924 a wide-ranging series of treaties was agreed between Britain and Russia. "The most-favoured-nation status was given to the Soviet Union in exchange for concessions to British holders of Czarist bonds, and Britain agreed to recommend a loan to the Soviet government." (50)

Stanley Baldwin, the leader of the Conservative Party, and H. H. Asquith, the leader of the Liberal Party, decided to being the Labour government down over the issue of its relationship with the Soviet Union. On 30th September, the Liberals condemned the recently agreed trade deal. They claimed, unjustly, that Britain had given the Russians what they wanted without resolving the claims of British bondholders who had suffered in the revolution. "MacDonald reacted peevishly to this, accusing them of being unscrupulous and dishonest." (51)

The following day, Conservatives put down a censure motion on the decision to drop the case against John Ross Campbell. The debate took place on 8th October. MacDonald lost the vote by 364 votes to 198. "Labour was brought down, on the Campbell case, by the combined ranks of Conservatives and Liberals... The Labour government had lasted 259 days. On six occasions the Conservatives had saved MacDonald from defeat in the 1923 parliament, but it was the Liberals who pulled the political rung from under him." (52)

The Daily Mail published the Zinoviev Letter on 25th October 1924, just four days before the 1924 General Election. Under the headline "Civil War Plot by Socialists Masters" it argued: "Moscow issues orders to the British Communists... the British Communists in turn give orders to the Socialist Government, which it tamely and humbly obeys... Now we can see why Mr MacDonald has done obeisance throughout the campaign to the Red Flag with its associations of murder and crime. He is a stalking horse for the Reds as Kerensky was... Everything is to be made ready for a great outbreak of the abominable class war which is civil war of the most savage kind." (53)

The rest of the Tory owned newspapers ran the story over the next few days and it was no surprise when the election was a disaster for the Labour Party. The Conservatives won 412 seats and formed the next government. Lord Beaverbrook, the owner of the Daily Express and Evening Standard, told Lord Rothermere, the owner of The Daily Mail and The Times, that the "Red Letter" campaign had won the election for the Conservatives. Rothermere replied that it was probably worth a hundred seats. (54)

Stanley Baldwin, became prime minister again and set up a Cabinet committee to look into the Zinoviev Letter. On 19th November, 1924, the Foreign Secretary, Austin Chamberlain, reported that members of the committee were "unanimously of opinion that there was no doubt as to the authenticity of the Letter". This judgement was based on a report written by Desmond Morton. Morton came up with "five very good reasons" why he thought the letter was genuine. These were: its source, an agent in Moscow "of proved reliability"; "direct independent confirmation" from CPGB and ARCOS sources in London; "subsidiary confirmation" in the form of supposed "frantic activity" in Moscow; because the possibility of SIS being taken in by White Russians was "entirely excluded"; and because the subject matter of the Letter was "entirely consistent with all that the Communists have been enunciating and putting into effect". Gill Bennett, who has studied the subject in great depth claims: "All five of these reasons can be shown to be misleading, if not downright false." (55) Eight days later, Morton admitted in a letter to MI5 that "we are firmly convinced this actual thing (the Zinoviev letter) is a forgery." (56)

Baldwin wanted to appoint Neville Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Chamberlain, however, believed that whereas he might make a great Minister of Health he would only ever be a second-rate Chancellor and requested a move to the Department of Health. Baldwin accepted his arguments and appointed Winston Churchill as Chancellor. Chamberlain immediately embarked upon an ambitious programme of social reform in the areas of housing, health, local government, the extension of national insurance and widows' pensions. Over the next five years he proposed 25 pieces of progressive legislation, 21 of which became law. Graham Stewart argued that "under his guidance, the confused and complicated patchwork of local government was entirely rationalised by 1929 with a commanding sweep which - put to a different goal - would have been the envy of any totalitarian planner." (57)

Baldwin often came into conflict with Churchill over economic issues. Despite the problem of low Government revenues Churchill was determined not to increase personal taxes. In 1925 the majority of people did not pay income tax - only 2½ million people were liable and just 90,000 paid super-tax. The standard rate of income tax was reduced from four shillings and sixpence to four shillings in the pound. The super-tax was reduced by £10 million, which was substantial in relation to the total yield of the tax at £60 million: "This was of substantial benefit to the rich, not only as individual taxpayers but also in the capacity of many of them as shareholders, for income tax was then the principal form of company taxation." (58)

In a letter to James Gascoyne-Cecil, 4th Marquess of Salisbury, the leader of the House of Lords, he argued that "the rich, whether idle or not, are already taxed in this country to the very highest point compatible with the accumulation of capital for further production." (59) In a second letter he stated that cutting taxes was a "class measure" that was designed "to help the comfortably off and the rich." (60)

Churchill's social conservatism was also apparent during discussions within the Government over changes to unemployment insurance. The scheme that the Liberal government had introduced in 1911 had collapsed after the war because of large-scale structural unemployment, particularly among trades that were not covered by the scheme. A benefit (the dole) was first introduced for unemployed ex-servicemen, later extended to others and then made subject to a means test in 1922. Churchill thought that far too many people were drawing the "dole". (61)

Winston Churchill spoke in the House of Commons of the "growing up of a habit of qualifying for unemployment relief" and the need for an enquiry. (62) Three weeks later he told Thomas Jones, the Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet, that "there should be an immediate stiffening of the administration, and the position should be made much more difficult for young unmarried men living with relatives, wives with husbands at work, aliens, etc." (63)

Churchill wrote to Arthur Steel-Maitland, the Minister of Labour, to explain his ideas. He suggested that when the legislation to pay for the dole expired in 1926, rather than reduce the benefit, as most of his colleagues wanted to do, they should abolish it altogether. Churchill said: "It is profoundly injurious to the state that this system should continue; it is demoralising to the whole working class population... it is charitable relief; and charitable relief should never be enjoyed as a right." Churchill told Steel-Maitland that the huge number of unemployed families would have to depend on private charity once their insurance benefits were exhausted. The Government might make some donations to charities but money would only be given to "deserving cases" and that "by proceeding on the present lines we are rotting the youth of the country and rupturing the mainsprings of its energies". (64)

Churchill attempted to get his ideas supported by Stanley Baldwin: "I am thinking less about saving the exchequer than about saving the moral fibre of our working classes." (65) Churchill did not get his way. The other members of the Government, including Neville Chamberlain, regardless of any possible moral consequences, could not face the political impact of ending the ‘dole' at a time when over a million people were out of work. (66)

In 1925 Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, urged the government to introduce legislation to reduce the powers of the trade union movement. It was a time of high employment and Churchill believed this was the time to hurt them when they were economically weak. As the government refused to act, a Conservative Party backbench MP, Frederick A. Macquisten, introduced a private members bill that would force trade union members to voluntarily 'contract in' to pay the political levy to the Labour Party. Macquisten argued that "what I am proposing now is to relieve the working man of this liability to be taxed." (67)

Stanley Baldwin made a speech in the House of Commons on why he could not support this bill. "Those two forces with which we have to reckon are enormously strong, and they are the two forces in this country to which now, to a great extent, and it will be a greater extent in the future, we are committed. We have to see what wise statesmanship can do to steer the country through this time of evolution, until we can get to the next stage of our industrial civilisation. It is obvious from what I have said that the organisations of both masters and men - or, if you like the more modern phrase invented by economists, who always invent beastly words, employers and employees, these organisations throw an immense responsibility on the representatives themselves and on those who elect them... In this great problem which is facing the country in years to come, it may be from one side or the other that disaster may come, but surely it shows that the only progress that can be obtained in this country is by those two bodies of men - so similar in their strength and so similar in their weaknesses - learning to understand each other, and not to fight each other." (68)

On 30th June 1925 the mine-owners announced that they intended to reduce the miner's wages. Will Paynter later commented: "The coal owners gave notice of their intention to end the wage agreement then operating, bad though it was, and proposed further wage reductions, the abolition of the minimum wage principle, shorter hours and a reversion to district agreements from the then existing national agreements. This was, without question, a monstrous package attack, and was seen as a further attempt to lower the position not only of miners but of all industrial workers." (69)

On 23rd July, 1925, Ernest Bevin, the general secretary of the Transport & General Workers Union (TGWU), moved a resolution at a conference of transport workers pledging full support to the miners and full co-operation with the General Council in carrying out any measures they might decide to take. A few days later the railway unions also pledged their support and set up a joint committee with the transport workers to prepare for the embargo on the movement of coal which the General Council had ordered in the event of a lock-out." (70) It has been claimed that the railwaymen believed "that a successful attack on the miners would be followed by another on them." (71)

In an attempt to avoid a General Strike, the prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, invited the leaders of the miners and the mine owners to Downing Street on 29th July. The miners kept firm on what became their slogan: "Not a minute on the day, not a penny off the pay". Herbert Smith, the president of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, told Baldwin: "We have now to give". Baldwin insisted there would be no subsidy: "All the workers of this country have got to take reductions in wages to help put industry on its feet." (72)

The following day the General Council of the Trade Union Congress triggered a national embargo on coal movements. On 31st July, the government capitulated. It announced an inquiry into the scope and methods of reorganization of the industry, and Baldwin offered a subsidy that would meet the difference between the owners' and the miners' positions on pay until the new Commission reported. The subsidy would end on 1st May 1926. Until then, the lockout notices and the strike were suspended. This event became known as Red Friday because it was seen as a victory for working class solidarity. (73)

Red Friday was a great success for Herbert Smith and Arthur J. Cook. However, Margaret Morris has argued that they had a difficult relationship: "Smith was temperamentally and politically the antithesis of Cook. Where Cook was emotional and voluble, Smith was dour and short of words. He was an old-style union leader, used to dominating the miners in Yorkshire... Relations between Smith and Cook were not always harmonious; neither of them really trusted the other's judgement, but each could respect that the other was dedicated to serving the miners. Neither of them was a very good negotiator: Cook was too excitable, and Smith perhaps a little too defensive in his tactics." (74)

The Royal Commission was established under the chairmanship of Sir Herbert Samuel, to look into the problems of the Mining Industry. The commissioners took evidence from nearly eighty witnesses from both sides of the industry. They also received a great mass of written evidence, and visited twenty-five mines in various parts of Great Britain. The Samuel Commission published its report on 10th March 1926. Interest in it was so great that it sold over 100,000 copies. (75)

The Samuel Report was critical of the mine owners: "We cannot agree with the view presented to us by the mine owners that little can be done to improve the organization of the industry, and that the only practical course is to lengthen hours and to lower wages. In our view huge changes are necessary in other directions, and the large progress is possible". The report recognised that the industry needed to be reorganised but rejected the suggestion of nationalization. However, the report also recommended that the Government subsidy should be withdrawn and the miners' wages should be reduced. (76)

Herbert Smith rejected the Samuel Report and told a meeting with representatives of the colliery owners: "We are willing to do all we can to help this industry, but it is with this proviso, that when we have worked and given our best, we are going to demand a respectable day's wage for a respectable day's work; and that is not your intention." He added: "Not a penny off the pay, not a second on the day." (77)

The National Union of Mineworkers was put in a difficult position when Jimmy Thomas, the general secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), welcomed the Samuel Report as a "wonderful document". A. J. Cook, at the MFGB conference advised delegates not to reject the report outright, so as not to jeopardise the support of the TUC. He was aware of the need to appear reasonable, but he also reaffirmed his opposition to wage reductions: "I am of the opinion we have got the biggest fight of our lives in front of us, but we cannot fight alone." (78)

Stanley Baldwin and his ministers had several meetings with both sides in order to avoid the strike. Thomas Jones, the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, pointed out: "It is possible not to feel the contrast between the reception which Ministers give to a body of owners and a body of miners. Ministers are at ease at once with the former, they are friends jointly exploring a situation. There was hardly any indication of opposition or censure. It was rather a joint discussion of whether it was better to precipitate a strike or the unemployment which would result from continuing the present terms. The majority clearly wanted a strike." (79)

Considering themselves in a position of strength, the Mining Association now issued new terms of employment. These new procedures included an extension of the seven-hour working day, district wage-agreements, and a reduction in the wages of all miners. Depending on a variety of factors, the wages would be cut by between 10% and 25%. The mine-owners announced that if the miners did not accept their new terms of employment then from the first day of May they would be locked out of the pits. (80)

At the end of April 1926, the miners were locked out of the pits. A Conference of Trade Union Congress met on 1st May 1926, and afterwards announced that a General Strike "in defence of miners' wages and hours" was to begin two days later. The leaders of the Trade Union Council were unhappy about the proposed General Strike, and during the next two days frantic efforts were made to reach an agreement with the Conservative Government and the mine-owners. (81)

The Trade Union Congress called the General Strike on the understanding that they would then take over the negotiations from the Miners' Federation. The main figure involved in an attempt to get an agreement was Jimmy Thomas. Talks went on until late on Sunday night, and according to Thomas, they were close to a successful deal when Stanley Baldwin broke off negotiations as a result of a dispute at the Daily Mail. (82)

What had happened was that Thomas Marlowe, the editor the newspaper, had produced a provocative leading article, headed "For King and Country", which denounced the trade union movement as disloyal and unpatriotic.The workers in the machine room, had asked for the article to be changed, when he refused they stopped working. Although, George Isaacs, the union shop steward, tried to persuade the men to return to work, Marlowe took the opportunity to phone Baldwin about the situation. (83)

The strike was unofficial and the TUC negotiators apologized for the printers' behaviour, but Baldwin refused to continue with the talks. "It is a direct challenge, and we cannot go on. I am grateful to you for all you have done, but these negotiations cannot continue. This is the end... The hotheads had succeeded in making it impossible for the more moderate people to proceed to try to reach an agreement." A letter was handed to the TUC negotiators that stated that the "gross interference with the freedom of the press" involved a "challenge to the constitutional rights and freedom of the nation". (84)

The General Strike began on 3rd May, 1926. The Trade Union Congress adopted the following plan of action. To begin with they would bring out workers in the key industries - railwaymen, transport workers, dockers, printers, builders, iron and steel workers - a total of 3 million men (a fifth of the adult male population). Only later would other trade unionists, like the engineers and shipyard workers, be called out on strike. Ernest Bevin, the general secretary of the Transport & General Workers Union (TGWU), was placed in charge of organising the strike. (85)

The TUC decided to publish its own newspaper, The British Worker, during the strike. Some trade unionists had doubts about the wisdom of not allowing the printing of newspapers. Workers on the Manchester Guardian sent a plea to the TUC asking that all "sane" newspapers be allowed to be printed. However, the TUC thought it would be impossible to discriminate along such lines. Permission to publish was sought by George Lansbury for Lansbury's Labour Weekly and H. N. Brailsford for the New Leader. The TUC owned Daily Herald also applied for permission to publish. Although all these papers could be relied upon to support the trade union case, permission was refused. (86)

The government reacted by publishing The British Gazette. Baldwin gave permission to Winston Churchill to take control of this venture and his first act was commandeer the offices and presses of The Morning Post, a right-wing newspaper. The company's workers refused to cooperate and non-union staff had to be employed. Baldwin told a friend that he gave Churchill the job because "it will keep him busy, stop him doing worse things". He added he feared that Churchill would turn his supporters "into an army of Bolsheviks". (87)

Stanley Baldwin made several broadcasts on the BBC. Baldwin "had recognized the importance of the new medium from its inception... now, with an expert blend of friendliness and firmness, he repeated that the strike had first to be called off before negotiations could resume, but repudiated the suggestion that the Government was fighting to lower the standard of living of the miners or of any other section of the workers". (88)

In one broadcast Baldwin argued: "A solution is within the grasp of the nation the instant that the trade union leaders are willing to abandon the General Strike. I am a man of peace. I am longing and working for peace, but I will not surrender the safety and security of the British Constitution. You placed me in power eighteen months ago by the largest majority accorded to any party for many years. Have I done anything to forfeit that confidence? Cannot you trust me to ensure a square deal, to secure even justice between man and man?" (89)

By 12th May, 1926, most of the daily newspapers had resumed publication. The Daily Express reported that the "strike had a broken back" and it would be all over by the end of the week. (90) Harold Harmsworth, Lord Rothermere, was extremely hostile to the strike and all his newspapers reflected this view. The Daily Mirror stated that the "workers have been led to take part in this attempt to stab the nation in the back by a subtle appeal to the motives of idealism in them." (91) The Daily Mail claimed that the strike was one of "the worst forms of human tyranny". (92)

Walter Citrine, the general secretary of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), was desperate to bring an end to the General Strike. He argued that it was important to reopen negotiations with the government. His view was "the logical thing is to make the best conditions while our members are solid". Baldwin refused to talk to the TUC while the General Strike persisted. Citrine therefore contacted Jimmy Thomas, the general secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), who shared this view of the strike, and asked him to arrange a meeting with Herbert Samuel, the Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry. (93)

Without telling the miners, the TUC negotiating committee met Samuel on 7th May and they worked out a set of proposals to end the General Strike. These included: (i) a National Wages Board with an independent chairman; (ii) a minimum wage for all colliery workers; (iii) workers displaced by pit closures to be given alternative employment; (iv) the wages subsidy to be renewed while negotiations continued. However, Samuel warned that subsequent negotiations would probably mean a reduction in wages. These terms were accepted by the TUC negotiating committee, but were rejected by the executive of the Miners' Federation. (94)

Herbert Smith was furious with the TUC for going behind the miners back. One of those involved in the negotiations, John Bromley of the NUR, commented: "By God, we are all in this now and I want to say to the miners, in a brotherly comradely spirit... this is not a miners' fight now. I am willing to fight right along with them and suffer as a consequence, but I am not going to be strangled by my friends." Smith replied: "I am going to speak as straight as Bromley. If he wants to get out of this fight, well I am not stopping him." (95)

On the 11th May, at a meeting of the Trade Union Congress General Committee, it was decided to accept the terms proposed by Herbert Samuel and to call off the General Strike. The following day, the TUC General Council visited 10 Downing Street and attempted to persuade the Government to support the Samuel proposals and to offer a guarantee that there would be no victimization of strikers. Baldwin refused but did say if the miners returned to work on the current conditions he would provide a subsidy for six weeks and then there would be the pay cuts that the Mine Owners Association wanted to impose. He did say that he would legislate for the amalgamation of pits, introduce a welfare levy on profits and introduce a national wages board. The TUC negotiators agreed to this deal. As Lord Birkenhead, a member of the Government was to write later, the TUC's surrender was "so humiliating that some instinctive breeding made one unwilling even to look at them." (96)

Stanley Baldwin already knew that the Mine Owners Association would not agree to the proposed legislation. They had already told Baldwin that he must not meddle in the coal industry. It would be "impossible to continue the conduct of the industry under private enterprise unless it is accorded the same freedom from political interference that is enjoyed by other industries." (97)

When the General Strike was terminated, the miners were left to fight alone. Cook appealed to the public to support them in the struggle against the Mine Owners Association: "We still continue, believing that the whole rank and file will help us all they can. We appeal for financial help wherever possible, and that comrades will still refuse to handle coal so that we may yet secure victory for the miners' wives and children who will live to thank the rank and file of the unions of Great Britain." (98)

On 21st June 1926, the British Government introduced a Bill into the House of Commons that suspended the miners' Seven Hours Act for five years - thus permitting a return to an 8 hour day for miners. In July the mine-owners announced new terms of employment for miners based on the 8 hour day. As Anne Perkins has pointed out this move "destroyed any notion of an impartial government". (99)

Hardship forced men to begin to drift back to the mines. By the end of August, 80,000 miners were back, an estimated ten per cent of the workforce. 60,000 of those men were in two areas, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. "Cook set up a special headquarters there and rushed from meeting to meeting. He was like a beaver desperately trying to dam the flood. When he spoke, in, say, Hucknall, thousands of miners who had gone back to work would openly pledge to rejoin the strike. They would do so, perhaps for two or three days, and then, bowed down by shame and hunger, would drift back to work." (100)

In October 1926 hardship forced men to begin to drift back to the mines. By the end of November most miners had reported back to work. Will Paynter remained loyal to the strike although he knew they had no chance of winning. "The miners' lock-out dragged on through the months of 1926 and really was petering-out when the decision came to end it. We had fought on alone but in the end we had to accept defeat spelt out in further wage-cuts." (101)

As one historian pointed out: "Many miners found they had no jobs to return to as many coal-owners used the eight-hour day to reduce their labour force while maintaining productions levels. Victimisation was practised widely. Militants were often purged from payrolls. Blacklists were drawn up and circulated among employers; many energetic trade unionists never worked in a pit again after 1926. Following months of existence on meague lockout payments and charity, many miners' families were sucked by unemployment, short-term working, debts and low wages into abject poverty." (102)

Neville Chamberlain wrote "Stanley Baldwin has suffered most from the strike; he too is worn out and has no spirit left." (103) It was claimed that Baldwin was on the edge of nervous collapse and felt he had to go on holiday to France. The national cost of nearly £100 million and a total loss of nearly £250 million had been incurred."Whole communities were alienated and impoverished; a large part of the nation was left with a feeling halfway between guilt and unease; and Baldwin's reputation as a statesman of sagacious moderation was badly dented." (104)

In 1927 the British Government passed the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act. This act made all sympathetic strikes illegal, ensured the trade union members had to voluntarily 'contract in' to pay the political levy to the Labour Party, forbade Civil Service unions to affiliate to the TUC, and made mass picketing illegal. As A. J. P. Taylor has pointed out: "The attack on Labour party finance came ill from the Conservatives who depended on secret donations from rich men." (105)

The legislation defined all sympathetic strikes as illegal, confining the right to strike to "the trade or industry in which the strikers are engaged". The funds of any union engaging in an illegal strike was liable in respect of civil damages. It also limited the right to picket, in terms so vague that almost any form of picketing might be liable to prosecution. As Julian Symons has pointed out: "More than any other single measure, the Trade Disputes Act caused hatred of Baldwin and his Government among organized trade unionists." (106)

One of the results of this legislation was that trade union membership fell below the 5,000,000 mark for the first time since 1926. However, despite its victory over the trade union movement, the public turned against the Conservative Party. Over the next three years the Labour Party won all the thirteen by-elections that took place. Stanley Baldwin considered offering government help to relieving distress in high unemployment areas but Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, insisted that "we must harden our hearts". (107)

In November 1926 Baldwin appointed John C. Davidson as chairman of the Conservative Party organization. "Davidson's period as party chairman was the most important and visible phase of his career. Although there were difficulties, his tenure is considered to have been one of the most significant in the development of the Conservative electoral machine in the twentieth century - a period in which it had been an important factor in the party's success.... He made a significant contribution in three main areas: rationalizing the basic structure, developing new areas, and expanding the scale of operations." (107a)

Stanley Baldwin and Davidson wanted to change the image of the Conservative Party to make it appear a less right-wing organisation. In March 1927 He suggested to his Cabinet that the government should propose legislation for the enfranchisement of nearly five million women between the ages of twenty-one and thirty. This measure meant that women would constitute almost 53% of the British electorate. The Daily Mail complained that these impressionable young females would be easily manipulated by the Labour Party. (108)

Churchill was totally opposed to the move and argued that the affairs of the country ought not be put into the hands of a female majority. In order to avoid giving the vote to all adults he proposed that the vote be taken away from all men between twenty-one and thirty. He lost the argument and in Cabinet and asked for a formal note of dissent to be entered in the minutes. There was little opposition in Parliament to the bill and it became law on 2nd July 1928. As a result, all women over the age of 21 could now vote in elections. (109)

There was little opposition in Parliament to the bill and it became law on 2nd July 1928. As a result, all women over the age of 21 could now vote in elections. Many of the women who had fought for this right were now dead including Elizabeth Garrett Anderson, Barbara Bodichon, Emily Davies, Elizabeth Wolstenholme-Elmy, Constance Lytton and Emmeline Pankhurst. Millicent Fawcett, the leader of the NUWSS during the campaign for the vote, was still alive and had the pleasure of attending Parliament to see the vote take place. That night she wrote in her diary that it was almost exactly 61 years ago since she heard John Stuart Mill introduce his suffrage amendment to the Reform Bill on May 20th, 1867." (110)

Davidson was determined to concentrate his future political campaigns to gain the support of women voters. He employed Marjorie Maxse, as Deputy Chief Agent, to make it quite clear to the Party that the women were to play a "very important part in the development of Conservatism in the country". (72) It has been pointed out by Neal R. McCrillis, the author of The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage (1998), that she told party agents "to teach women to be voters and Conservative voters, not to create a feminist movement within the Conservative party". (110a)

According to her biographer, Mark Pottle Marjorie Maxse believed that "women Conservatives were important for fund-raising and canvassing, and... she believed that men mostly did not wish to give them organizational responsibility and so she favoured developing separate women's branches at the constituency level... By retaining a separate organization women stood a greater chance to gain recognition of their role, as well as retain a degree of autonomy. She appreciated that this could also lead to their being marginalized, but on balance she felt that the policy brought about real advances." (110b)

Another important woman in Davidson's campaign was Caroline Bridgeman (the first woman to be Chairman of the Annual Conference). Davidson wrote to Sir Charles Hall-Cain about the good work that Bridgeman was doing: "When I think of the sacrifice that some of our women have made and the incalculable services they have given to the Party - women like Lady Bridgeman - it is not surprising that I am moved to cheer them on to further efforts... Whether we like it or not, the future of the country is largely in the hands of the women, equally with us men, and no greater service can be rendered to the Party than to provide as powerful a centre as possible in London for the attraction and education of Conservative women." (110c)

Baldwin firmly believed that he would win the 1929 General Election. He realised that he did not have a good manifesto, "but thought that his reputation as a moderate statesman, calmly if slowly steering the country in the right direction, would overcome that". (111) In its manifesto the Conservative Party blamed the General Strike for the country's economic problems. "Trade suffered a severe set-back owing to the General Strike, and the industrial troubles of 1926. In the last two years it has made a remarkable recovery. In the insured industries, other than the coal mining industry, there are now 800,000 more people employed and 125,000 fewer unemployed than when we assumed office... This recovery has been achieved by the combined efforts of our people assisted by the Government's policy of helping industry to help itself. The establishment of stable conditions has given industry confidence and opportunity." (112)

The Labour Party attacked the record of Baldwin's government: "By its inaction during four critical years it has multiplied our difficulties and increased our dangers. Unemployment is more acute than when Labour left office.... The Government's further record is that it has helped its friends by remissions of taxation, whilst it has robbed the funds of the workers' National Health Insurance Societies, reduced Unemployment Benefits, and thrown thousands of workless men and women on to the Poor Law. The Tory Government has added £38,000,000 to indirect taxation, which is an increasing burden on the wage-earners, shop-keepers and lower middle classes." (113)

In the 1929 General Election the Conservatives won 8,656,000 votes (38%), the Labour Party 8,309,000 (37%) and the Liberals 5,309,000 (23%). However, the bias of the system worked in Labour's favour, and in the House of Commons the party won 287 seats, the Conservatives 261 and the Liberals 59. The Conservatives lost 150 seats and became for the first time a smaller parliamentary party than Labour. David Lloyd George, the leader of the Liberals, admitted that his campaign had been unsuccessful but claimed he held the balance of power: "It would be silly to pretend that we have realised our expectations. It looks for the moment as if we still hold the balance." However, both Baldwin and MacDonald refused to form a coalition government with Lloyd George. Baldwin resigned and once again MacDonald agreed to form a minority government. (114)

Winston Churchill was furious with both David Lloyd George and Stanley Baldwin that they had allowed this to happen. Lloyd George argued that he had no choice but to do this as his manifesto promises were much closer to the policies of the Labour Party. Churchill replied: "Never mind, you have done your best, and if Britain alone among modern States chooses to cast away her rights, her interests and her strength, she must learn by bitter experience." (115)

John C. Davidson was attacked by some members for his role in the general election campaign. "I have often been heavily criticized for concentrating the attack of the campaign on the Liberals rather than on the Socialists. There is a certain amount of justification in this criticism, but the reason we attacked the Liberals heavily was because they had a far greater nuisance value than they really deserved. They had no policy, they had - so far as one could tell - no political principles differing from ours, and yet they were determined to split the vote in order to get Labour in." (115a)

Davidson told Samuel Hoare that being chairman of the Conservative Party was a "thankless task" and "a blind alley" (115b) Neville Chamberlain led the attacks on Davidson and criticised the uninspiring campaign themes of "Safety first" and "Trust Baldwin". Davidson had alienated a range of figures, including the two main press barons, Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook. Rothermere that Baldwin did badly in the election because he was too left-wing and probably a "crypto-socialist". Chamberlain told Davidson bluntly in April that he had to go; after further delay, Chamberlain pressed again and Davidson resigned on 29th May, 1930. (115c)

Lord Rothermere believed that Stanley Baldwin did badly in the election because he was too left-wing and probably a "crypto-socialist". Rothermere was especially concerned about the government's attitude towards the British Empire. Rothermere agreed with Brendan Bracken when he wrote: "This wretched Government, with the aid of the Liberals and some eminent Tories, is about to commit us to one of the most fatal decisions in all our history, and there is practically no opposition to their policy". Bracken believed that with the support of the Rothermere and the Beaverbrook newspaper empires it would be possible "to preserve the essentials of British rule in India". (116)

Lord Beaverbrook agreed and as he explained to Robert Borden, the former Canadian prime minister: "The Government is trying to unite Mohammedan and Hindu. It will never succeed. There will be no amalgamation between these two. There is only one way to govern India. And that is the way laid down by the ancient Romans - was it the Gracchi, or was it Romulus, or was it one of the Emperors? - that is Divide and Rule". (117)

Rothermere agreed to join forces with Beaverbrook, in order to remove Baldwin from the leadership of the Tory Party. According to one source: "Rothermere's feelings amounted to hatred. He had backed Baldwin strongly in 1924, and his subsequent disenchantment was thought to be connected with Baldwin's unaccountable failure to reward him with an earldom and his son Esmond, an MP, with a post in the government. By 1929 Rothermere, a man of pessimistic temperament, had come to believe that with the socialists in power the world was nearing its end; and Baldwin was doing nothing to save it. He was especially disturbed by the independence movement in India, to which he thought both the government and Baldwin were almost criminally indulgent." (118)

Rothermere and Beaverbrook believed the best way to undermine Baldwin was to campaign on the policy of giving countries within the British Empire preferential trade terms. Beaverbrook began the campaign on 5th December, 1929, when he announced the establishment of the Empire Free Trade movement. On the 10th December, the Daily Express front page had the banner headlines: "JOIN THE EMPIRE CRUSADE TODAY" and called on its readers to register as supporters. It also proclaimed that "the great body of feeling in the country which is behind the new movement must be crystallised in effective form". The appeal for "recruits" was repeated in Beaverbrook's other newspapers such as the Evening Standard and the Sunday Express. All his newspapers told those who had already registered their support to "enroll your friends... we are an army with a great task before us." (119)

In January, 1930, Rothermere's newspapers came out in support of Empire Free Trade. George Ward Price, a faithful Rothermere mouthpiece, wrote in the Sunday Dispatch, that "no man living in this country today with more likelihood of succeeding to the Premiership of Great Britain than Lord Beaverbrook". (120) The Daily Mail also called on Baldwin to resign and be replaced the press baron. Beaverbrook responded by describing Rothermere as "the greatest trustee of public opinion we have seen in the history of journalism." (121)

Beaverbrook wrote to Sir Rennell Rodd explaining why he had joined forces with Rothermere to remove Baldwin: "I hope you will not be prejudiced about Rothermere. He is a very fine man. I wish I had his good points. It (working with Rothermere) would make the Crusade more popular among the aristocracy - the real enemies in the Conservative Party... It is time these people were being swept out of their preferred positions in public life and their sons and grandsons being sent to work like those of other people." (122)

Rothermere now joined the campaign of Empire Free Trade: "British manufacturers and British work people are turning out the best goods to be bought in the world. They are far ahead of their competitors in two of the most important factors - quality and durability. The achievement of our industrialists and workers in the more impressive because they are handicapped in so many ways. Whereas in foreign countries politicians are considerate of industry and do all that is in their power to aid it, here the politicians will not even condescend to tell those few trades which have some slight vestige of tariff protection whether that protection is going to be continued or abolished." (123)

Beaverbrook had a meeting with Baldwin about the Conservative Party adopting his policy of Empire Free Trade. Baldwin rejected the idea as it would mean taxes on non-Empire imports. Robert Bruce Lockhart, who worked for Lord Beaverbrook, wrote in his diary: "In evening saw Lord Beaverbrook who will announced his New Party on Monday, provided Rothermere comes out in favour of food taxes. It is a big venture." Beaverbrook's plan was to run candidates at by-elections and general elections. This "would wreck the prospects of many Tory candidates, thus destroying Baldwin's hopes of a majority in the next Parliament". (124)

On 18th February, 1930, Beaverbrook announced the formation of the United Empire Party. The following day Lord Rothermere gave his full support to the party. A small group of businessmen, including Beaverbrook and Rothermere, donated a total of £40,000 to help fund the party. The Daily Express also asked its readers to send in money and in return promised to publish their names in the newspaper. Beaverbrook presented Conservative MPs with an implied ultimatum: "No MP espousing the cause of Empire Free Trade will be opposed by a United Empire candidate. Instead, he shall have, if he desires it, our full support. If the Conservatives split, they will do so because at last the true spirit of Conservatism has a chance to find expression." (125)

In the Daily Mail Rothermere ran stories about the new party on the front page for ten days in succession. According to the authors of Beaverbrook: A Life (1992): "With their combined total of eight national papers, and Rothermere's chain of provincial papers, the press barons were laying down a joint barrage scarcely paralleled in newspaper history." Rothermere told Beaverbrook that "this movement is like a prairie fire". Leo Amery described Beaverbrook "bubbling over with excitement and triumph". (126)

Beaverbrook later admitted that as a press baron he had the right to bully the politician into pursuing courses he would not otherwise adopt. (127) Baldwin was badly shaken by these events and in March 1930 he agreed to a referendum on food taxes, and a detailed discussion of the issue at an imperial conference after the next election. This was not good enough for Rothermere and Beaverbrook and they decided to back candidates in by-elections who challenged the official Conservative line. (128)

Ernest Spero, the Labour MP, for West Fulham, was declared bankrupt and was forced to resign. Cyril Cobb, the Conservative Party candidate in the by-election, declared that he supported Empire Free Trade and this gave him the support of the newspapers owned by Rothermere and Beaverbrook. On 6th May, 1930, Cobb beat the Labour candidate, John Banfield, with a 3.5% swing. The Daily Express presented it as a win for Beaverbrook, with the headline: "CRUSADER CAPTURES SOCIALIST SEAT". (129)

Rothermere and Beaverbrook wanted Neville Chamberlain to replace Baldwin. They entered into negotiations with Chamberlain who expressed concerns about the long-term consequences of this attack on the Conservative Party. He was especially worried about the cartoons by David Low, that were appearing in the Evening Standard. Chamberlain argued that before a deal could be arranged: "Beaverbrook must call off his attacks on Baldwin and the Party, cease to include offensive cartoons and paragraphs in the Evening Standard, and stop inviting Conservatives to direct subscriptions to him in order that they might be used to run candidates against official Conservatives." (130) Beaverbrook told one of Chamberlain's friends that "nothing will shift us from the advocacy of duties on foodstuffs". (131)

Chamberlain claimed he remained loyal to Baldwin and refused to undermine his leader. He wrote in his diary: "The question of leadership is again growing acute… I am getting letters and communications from all over the country… I cannot see my way out. I am the only person who might bring about Stanley Baldwin's retirement, but I cannot act when my action might put me in his place." (132)

However, Peter Neville, the author of Neville Chamberlain (1992), has argued that there is evidence that Chamberlain spread information amongst fellow members of the Cabinet that undermined Baldwin: "Chamberlain's behaviour during the leadership crisis was not as disinterested as he subsequently maintained. This in itself was not particularly shocking. Politicians are ambitious, and Neville Chamberlain would in 1931 have attained a position which neither his father nor his half-brother had ever achieved - leadership of the Conservative Party." (133)

In June, 1930, Lord Rothermere wrote to Baldwin demanding that the leader of the Conservative Party needed to promise to submit the list of his planned Cabinet ministers if he wished to have the support of the Daily Mail for the next Tory government. Baldwin decided to make the letter public and argued that "a more preposterous and insolent demand was never made on the leader of any political party." He added: "I repudiate it with contempt and will fight that attempt at domination to the end." (134)

In October 1930, Vice-Admiral Ernest Taylor was selected to stand for the United Empire Party in the Paddington South by-election. Herbert Lidiard, the Conservative Party candidate, declared that he was a Baldwin loyalist. Beaverbrook told the nation that the contest was now between a "Conservative Imperialist" (Taylor) and a "Conservative Wobbler" (Lidiard). (135)

Baldwin was warned that the Conservative Party was in danger of losing the seat and if that happened he might be removed as leader. He decided to hold a meeting of Conservative peers, MPs and candidates before the election took place. Beaverbrook made a speech attacking the resolution expressing confidence in Baldwin was carried by 462 votes to 116. Baldwin claimed that Beaverbrook came out very badly out of the meeting: "The Beaver would not have spoken but Francis Curzon challenged him to speak. He was booed and made a poor speech.. and said that he didn't care two-pence who was leader as long as his policy was adopted!" (136)

With the support of the Rothermere and Beaverbrook press, Taylor defeated the official Conservative Party candidate by 1,415 votes. Beaverbrook wrote: "What a life! Excitement (being howled down at the party meeting), depression (being heavily defeated by Baldwin), exaltation (being successful at South Paddington." (137) Beaverbrook wrote to his good friend, Richard Smeaton White, the publisher of The Montreal Gazette: "I believe the Empire Crusade controls London. And we can, I am sure, dominate the Southern counties of Surrey, Sussex, and Kent, and we will dominate Baldwin too, for he must come to full acceptance of the policy." (138)

Rothermere and Beaverbrook became convinced that the way to remove Baldwin was to fight the official Conservative candidate in by-elections. Beaverbrook wrote to Rothermere: "I am going out entirely for by-elections this year, and shall exclude all other forms of propaganda. I shall make the by-elections the occasions for my propaganda." (139) Rothermere replied: "If you are going to build up a real organisation with full intentions of fighting all by-elections, go ahead and you will find me with you." (140)

In February, 1931, a by-election occurred at East Islington after the death of Ethel Bentham. The Labour candidate was Leah Manning. The Conservatives selected Thelma Cazalet-Keir and Air Commodore Alfred Critchley represented the United Empire Party. Beaverbrook spoke at eleven meetings in support of Critchley. One Tory said that "Lord Beaverbrook comes to East Islington and it compared to an elephant trumpeting in the jungle or a man-eating tiger. I am inclined to compare him to a mad dog running along the streets and yapping and barking." Despite this effort, Critchley only split the Conservative vote and the seat was won by Manning. (141)

The next by-election took place in Westminster St George. Lord Beaverbrook selected Ernest Petter, a Conservative industrialist "who will stand in opposition to Mr Baldwin's leadership and policy." The official Conservative candidate was Duff Cooper. However, on the 1st March, 1931, the party's chief political agent reported that there was "a very definite feeling" that Baldwin was "not strong enough to carry the party to victory". (142)

Neville Chamberlain, told Baldwin that his research suggested that the Conservatives would lose the by-election if he remained leader. On hearing the news Baldwin decided to resign. At the last minute William Bridgeman, a close friend and former Home Secretary, persuaded him to postpone his decision until after the Westminster by-election. (143)

The Daily Mail made a crude and abusive attack on Cooper calling him a "softy" and "Mickey Mouse" and accusing him falsely of having made a speech in Germany attacking the British Empire. Geoffrey Dawson of The Times remained loyal to Baldwin and invited Cooper to let him know if "I can do anything... to correct misstatements which the 'stunt' papers decline to admit." The Daily Telegraph also gave their support to Cooper and he was told by its owner that "you will find all our people, editorial, circulation, and everybody doing their damndest for you." (144)

The Daily Mail now made a personal attack on Baldwin and implied that he was unfit for government because he had squandered the family fortune: "Baldwin's father... left him an immense fortune which so far as may be learned from his own speeches, has almost disappeared... It is difficult to see how the leader of a party who has lost his own fortune can hope to restore that of anyone else, or of his country." (145)

Stanley Baldwin considered taking legal action but instead made a speech at the Queen's Hall on the power of the press barons: He accused Rothermere and Beaverbrook of wanting "power without responsibility - the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages" and using their newspapers not as "newspapers in the ordinary acceptance of the term", but as "engines of propaganda for the constantly changing policies, desires, personal wishes, personal likes and dislikes", enjoying "secret knowledge without the general view" and distorting the fortunes of national leaders "without being willing to bear their burdens". (146)

The attacks on Baldwin by Rothermere and Beaverbrook backfired. Duff Cooper won the seat easily. Beaverbrook struggled to come to terms with the result. He wrote: "I am horribly disappointed by the failure. It is much worse than I expected. I cannot believe that Press dictatorship was the reason for it." He told a friend that: "We lost St George's because of the strong cross-currents. It was a baffling contest and we were driven off course. We cannot take the result as a rejection of Empire Free Trade." (147)

Beaverbrook and Rothermere decided to bring the United Empire Party to an end. Rothermere, unlike Beaverbrook, did believe that Baldwin's attack on the press barons did have an impact on the result. He told one of his editors: "The amount of nonsense talked about the power of the newspaper proprietor is positively nauseating... Of course, I have long ceased to have any illusions on the point myself... How could I have any illusions on this score, after the way Baldwin managed to survive years of the most bitter newspaper attacks on his... muddle-headed policies." (148)

In July, 1931, the George May Committee produced (the two trade unionists refused to sign the document) its report that presented a picture of Great Britain on the verge of financial disaster. It proposed cutting £96,000,000 off the national expenditure. Of this total £66,500,000 was to be saved by cutting unemployment benefits by 20 per cent and imposing a means test on applicants for transitional benefit. Another £13,000,000 was to be saved by cutting teachers' salaries and grants in aid of them, another £3,500,000 by cutting service and police pay, another £8,000,000 by reducing public works expenditure for the maintenance of employment. "Apart from the direct effects of these proposed cuts, they would of course have given the signal for a general campaign to reduce wages; and this was doubtless a part of the Committee's intention." (149)

The five rich men on the committee recommended, not surprisingly, that only £24 million of this deficit should be met by increased taxation. As David W. Howell has pointed out: "A committee majority of actuaries, accountants, and bankers produced a report urging drastic economies; Latham and Pugh wrote a minority report that largely reflected the thinking of the TUC and its research department. Although they accepted the majority's contentious estimate of the budget deficit as £120 million and endorsed some economies, they considered the underlying economic difficulties not to be the result of excessive public expenditure, but of post-war deflation, the return to the gold standard, and the fall in world prices. An equitable solution should include taxation of holders of fixed-interest securities who had benefited from the fall in prices." (150)

The May Report had been intended to be used as a weapon to use against those Labour MPs calling for increased public expenditure. What it did in fact was to create abroad a belief in the insolvency of Britain and in the insecurity of the British currency, and thus to start a run on sterling, vast amounts of which were held by foreigners who had exchanged their own currencies for it in the belief that it was "as good as gold". This foreign-owned sterling was now exchanged into gold or dollars and soon began to threaten the stability of the pound. (151)

Philip Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, presented his recommendations to the Cabinet on 20th August. It included the plan to raise approximately £90 million from increased taxation and to cut expenditure by £99 million. £67 million was to come from unemployment insurance, £12 million from education and the rest from the armed services, roads and a variety of smaller programmes. Most members of the Cabinet rejected the idea of the proposed cut in unemployment benefit and the meeting ended without any decisions being made. Clement Attlee, who was a supporter of John Maynard Keynes, condemned Snowden for his "misplaced fidelity to laissez-faire economics". (152)

At another meeting on 23rd August, 1931, nine members (Arthur Henderson, George Lansbury, John R. Clynes, William Graham, Albert Alexander, Arthur Greenwood, Tom Johnson, William Adamson and Christopher Addison) of the Cabinet stated that they would resign rather than accept the unemployment cuts. A. J. P. Taylor has argued: "The other eleven were presumably ready to go along with MacDonald. Six of these had a middle-class or upper-class background; of the minority only one (Addison)... Clearly the government could not go on. Nine members were too many to lose." (153)

On 24th August 1931 King George V had a meeting with the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties. Herbert Samuel later recorded that he told the king that MacDonald should be maintained in office "in view of the fact that the necessary economies would prove most unpalatable to the working class". He added that MacDonald was "the ruling class's ideal candidate for imposing a balanced budget at the expense of the working class." (154) Baldwin agreed and he wrote to his wife that it was vitally important that it was MacDonald's government that made the cuts. (155)

Later that day Ramsay MacDonald returned to the palace and told the King that he had the Cabinet's resignation in his pocket. The King replied that he hoped that MacDonald "would help in the formation of a National Government." He added that by "remaining at his post, his position and reputation would be much more enhanced than if he surrendered the Government of the country at such a crisis." Eventually, he agreed to form a National Government. (156)

Ramsay MacDonald was only able to persuade three other members of the Labour Party to serve in the National Government: Philip Snowden (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Jimmy Thomas (Colonial Secretary) and John Sankey (Lord Chancellor). The Conservatives had four places and the Liberals two: Stanley Baldwin (Lord President), Neville Chamberlain (Minister of Health), Samuel Hoare (Secretary for India), Herbert Samuel (Home Secretary), Lord Reading (Foreign Secretary) and Philip Cunliffe-Lister (President of the Board of Trade). (157)

Chamberlain was successful in "impaling Labour on a series of ever more difficult hooks of financial policy, forcing Snowden to adopt the large-scale fiscal reforms demanded by the Conservatives and the City, whilst preventing a rise in the level of direct taxation, which would disproportionately affect the rich, the natural constituency". This enabled the Conservatives to promote the image that it was a Labour prime minister who was punishing the unemployment and to deflect unpalatable accusations that an "upper class" government was foisting "economies" on the most vulnerable sectors of society. (158)

The 1931 General Election was held on 27th October, 1931. MacDonald led an anti-Labour alliance made up of Conservatives and National Liberals. It was a disaster for the Labour Party with several leading Labour figures, including Arthur Henderson, John R. Clynes, Arthur Greenwood, Charles Trevelyan, Herbert Morrison, Emanuel Shinwell, Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, Hastings Lees-Smith, Hugh Dalton, Susan Lawrence, William Wedgwood Benn, Tom Shaw and Margaret Bondfield losing their seats. The Labour Party polled 30.5% of the vote reflecting the loss of two million votes, a huge withdrawal of support. The only significant concentration of Labour victories occurred in South Wales where eleven seats were retained, many by large majorities. (159)

MacDonald, now had 556 pro-National Government MPs and had no difficulty pursuing the policies suggested by Sir George May. Chamberlain was appointed as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer. He continued with Snowden's austerity-minded measures and in his first budget speech he argued: "Nothing could be more harmful to the ultimate material recovery of this country or to its present moral fibre… hard work, strict economy, firm courage, unfailing patience, these are the qualifications that are required of us, and with them we shall not fail." (160)

Roy Jenkins points out that Baldwin was the leader of the party which gave the Government nine-tenths of its majority, but he was only the third man in the hierarchy after MacDonald and Chamberlain. "This meant some easing of the burden, which he liked, but it also meant that he was not Prime Minister, which he also liked being, that he did not have Chequers, for which his affection was second only to that of MacDonald, and that his salary as Lord President was £2,000 instead of the £5,000 which Secretaries of State as well as the Prime Minister were paid." (161)

Chamberlain wrote in his diary: "I am more and more carrying this government on my back. The P.M. (MacDonald) is ill and tired, S. B. (Stanley Baldwin) is tired and won't apply his mind to problems. It is certainly time there was a change". (162) On 7th June 1935, MacDonald went to see King George V to tell him he was resigning as head of the National Government. The King said: "I wonder how you have stood it - especially the loss of your friends and their beastly behaviour. You have been the Prime Minister I have liked best; you have so many qualities, you have kept up the dignity of the office without using it to give you dignity." (163)

Stanley Baldwin now became prime minister for the third time. Chamberlain worked much harder than Baldwin and viewed himself as an being in control of the government. He told Hilda Chamberlain that he had become "a sort of Acting PM - only without the actual power of the PM." He complained that he had to say to Baldwin, "Have you thought" or "What would you say" when it would be quicker to say "This is what you must do." (164) In another letter he complained: "You would be astounded if you knew how impossible it is to get any decision taken unless I see that it is done myself and sometimes I wonder what would happen to this government if I were to be smashed up in a taxi collision." (165)

In February 1934, the Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) chaired by Sir Maurice Hankey, which reported to Cabinet that Germany was now Britain's "ultimate potential enemy". It was decided that Neville Chamberlain should be put in charge of defence expenditure. Graham Macklin has pointed out that Chamberlain now "became the supreme arbiter of the nation's defences, holding the purse strings and thus dictating the parameters of the debate surrounding the scale and direction of the rearmament drive. Chamberlain was not inclined either by temperament or desire, particularly in the aftermath of the Wall Street crash, to embark on a vast spending spree. Indeed, his first act was to present Treasury figures for defence estimates lower than at any time since the First World War." (166)

As the 1935 General Election took place on 14th November. Baldwin promised full support to the League of Nations. "The defence programme will be strictly confined to what is required to make the country and the Empire safe, and to fulfill our obligations towards the League. All the world knows that Britain will never use her forces for any aggressive purpose." (167) In the election the Conservative-dominated National Government lost 90 seats from its massive majority of 1931, but still retained an overwhelming majority of 255 in the House of Commons. Labour, with just over 8.3 million votes, 37.9 per cent, took 154 seats. (168)

Robert Blake has attempted to explain Baldwin's popularity: "He was peace-loving at a time when Britain hated the memory and dreaded the prospect of war. He was insular in an era of political isolationism, conciliatory in an age of compromise. He was easy-going during years with high endeavour was not the outstanding quality of his fellow-countrymen. If he misconstrued the European situation, so did almost everyone else. If he evaded realities, the nation was only too glad to follow... Pipe-smoking, phlegmatic, honest, kind, commonsensical, fond of pigs, the classics and the country, he represented to Englishmen an idealized and enlarged version of themselves. While the political climate remained calm they venerated, almost worshipped him." (169)

The DRC suggested that the government needed to spend £85 million on defence to deal with the threat of Germany. Chamberlain rejected this figure and told the DRC that he believed that financial stability was far more important than increasing spending on defence. "Today financial and economic risks are by far the most serious and urgent that the country has to face, and that other risks have to be run until the country has had time and opportunity to recuperate and our financial situation to improve." (170) It has been argued that in 1935 Britain had spent 3 per cent of her Gross National Product on defence compared with Germany's 8 per cent. In 1936 the figures had been 4 per cent for Britain against 13 per cent for Germany. (171)

Some members of the Conservative Party began attacking Chamberlain for his unwillingness to rapidly increase spending on defence. At that year's party conference, Chamberlain admitted that defence spending had reached a dangerous low level, but blamed successive Governments for the last eight and a half years, which, he pointedly reminded his audience, included his most vociferous critic, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill. (172)

Baldwin defended his government's record on rearmament. "I put before the whole House my own views with an appalling frankness. From 1933, I and my friends were all very worried about what was happening in Europe. You will remember at that time the Disarmament Conference was sitting in Geneva. You will remember at that time there was probably a stronger pacifist feeling running through this country than at any time since the War. I am speaking of 1933 and 1934... My position as the leader of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. I asked myself what chance was there... within the next year or two of that feeling being so changed that the country would give a mandate for rearmament? Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain. I think the country itself learned by certain events that took place during the winter of 1934-35 what the perils might be to it. All I did was to take a moment perhaps less unfortunate than another might have been, and we won the election with a large majority...In 1935 we got from the country - with a large majority - a mandate for doing a thing that no one, 12 months before, would have believed possible. (173)

Anne Perkins pointed out that in "a country wanted peace and plenty, rearming promised only the threat of war and the transfer of spending from the home front to the defence industry". Perkins goes on to argue that between the years "1930-7, spending on health and unemployment exceeded spending on defence for the only time in the 50-year period when a comparison can be made." (174)

The Conservative Party feared the spread of communism from the Soviet Union to the rest of Europe. Stanley Baldwin shared this concern and was fairly sympathetic to the military uprising in Spain against the left-wing Popular Front government. On the 19th July, 1936, Spain's prime minister, José Giral, sent a request to Leon Blum, the prime minister of the Popular Front government in France, for aircraft and armaments. The following day the French government decided to help and on 22nd July agreed to send 20 bombers and other arms. This news was criticized by the right-wing press and the non-socialist members of the government began to argue against the aid and therefore Blum decided to see what his British allies were going to do. (175)

Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, received advice that "apart from foreign intervention, the sides were so evenly balanced that neither could win." Eden warned Blum that he believed that if the French government helped the Spanish government it would only encourage Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini to aid the Nationalists. Edouard Daladier, the French war minister, was aware that French armaments were inferior to those that Franco could obtain from the dictators. Eden later recalled: "The French government acted most loyally by us." On 8th August the French cabinet suspended all further arms sales, and four days later it was decided to form an international committee of control "to supervise the agreement and consider further action." (176)

In a speech in October, 1936, Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour Party, described the Spanish Civil War as "a fight for the soul of Europe", charging that non-intervention had become "a farce". For the first time he stated that the government was guilty of incremental steps of appeasement. If Britain had stood firm against Mussolini over Abyssinia, there would not have been this trouble in Spain. He argued there had been "no policy in foreign affairs except the policy of giving way. The result of that is a world in anarchy." The government's policy "has not brought us nearer peace but has brought us closer and closer to the danger of war." (177)

Baldwin told Eden that he hoped that the next war Nazi Germany would fight would be against the Soviet Union. (178) In a letter to Churchill, Baldwin argued: "I do not believe Germany wants to move West because West would be a difficult programme for her, and if she does it before we are ready. I quite agree the picture is perfectly awful. If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, I should like to see the Bolshies and the Nazis doing it." (179)

King George V died on 20th January 1936. Thomas Jones, Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet, recorded in his diary that Baldwin was worried about the prospect of Prince Edward becoming King. "The King was sinking and died peacefully just before midnight. The Prince had been in on Sunday to have tea with the P.M. The P.M. found him normal, neither elevated at the prospect of kingship, nor depressed at his father's dying. There was no affection between the two... S.B. is distinctly nervous about him." (180)

For the last year the intelligence services had been concerned about Edward's relationship with Wallis Simpson, an American married woman. Henry Channon, the Conservative Party MP recorded: "Much gossip about the Prince of Wales' alleged Nazi leanings; he is alleged to have been influenced by Emerald Cunard (who is rather reprise with Herr Ribbentrop) through Mrs Simpson. The Coopers are furious, being fanatically pro-French and anti-German. He has just made an extraordinary speech to the British Legion advocating friendship with Germany; it is only a gesture, but a gesture that may be taken seriously in Germany and elsewhere. If only the Chancelleries of Europe knew that his speech was the result of Emerald Cunard's intrigues, themselves inspired by Herr Ribbentrop's dimple!" (181)

MI5 were also concerned by Simpson's relationship with Ribbentrop and was now keeping her under surveillance. Paul Schwarz, a member of the German Foreign Office staff in the 1930s, claimed in his book, This Man Ribbentrop: His Life and Times (1943), that secrets from the British government dispatch boxes were being widely circulated in Berlin and it was believed that Simpson was the source. A FBI report stated: "Certain would-be state secrets were passed on to Edward, and when it was found that Ribbentrop... actually received the same information, immediately Baldwin was forced to accept that the leakage had been located." (182)

From the beginning of his reign, Edward exhibited something approaching contempt for the routine of monarchy. Baldwin disliked "his general attitude of irresponsibility, selfishness and dislike for any of the functions of kingship other than easy popularity and personal privilege." (183) Baldwin became angry when he heard that Edward had an unofficial meeting with Joachim von Ribbentrop was ambassador to London and had requested a meeting with Adolf Hitler: "Who is King here? Baldwin or I? I myself wish to talk to Hitler and will do that, here or in Germany. Tell him that please." (184)

Most of the Cabinet became concerned about the behaviour of Edward VIII. In the early days of his reign, Neville Chamberlain, drafted a memorandum of complaint urging the king to "settle down". He suggested he should wear drabber clothes, carry out his official duties and not make public remarks about the slums or unemployment. A. J. P. Taylor has pointed out: "Baldwin suppressed the memorandum. As always, he made his time ally and waited on events." (185)

Hitler knew that both France and Britain were militarily stronger than Germany. However, their failure to take action against Italy, convinced him that they were unwilling to go to war with Germany. He therefore decided to break another aspect of the Treaty of Versailles by sending German troops into the Rhineland. The German generals were very much against the plan, claiming that the French Army would win a victory in the military conflict that was bound to follow this action. Hitler ignored their advice and on 1st March, 1936, three German battalions marched into the Rhineland. Hitler later admitted: "The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance." (186)

Sir Anthony Eden, the new foreign secretary, was summoned to Buckingham Palace and the King urged to take a sympathetic view of Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland. According to the German ambassador, the King told him: "I sent for the PM (Baldwin) and gave him a piece of my mind. I told the old so-and-so- that I would abdicate if he made war. There was a frightful scene. But you needn't worry. There won't be a war." (187)

The British government accepted Hitler's Rhineland coup. Eden informed the French that the British government was not prepared to support military action. The chiefs of staff felt Britain was in no position to go to war with Germany over the issue. The Rhineland invasion was not seen by the British government as an act of unprovoked aggression but as the righting of an injustice left behind by the Treaty of Versailles. Eden apparently said that he would not oppose the move because "Hitler was only going into his own back garden." (188)

In the summer of 1936 the King's relationship with Wallis Simpson, was being reported in the foreign press. Simpson had previously been married to Earl Winfield Spencer. Edward was still a bachelor at 41. "Mrs Wallis Simpson... was gay, witty, attractive. As a royal consort, she had every conceivable disadvantage. She was an American; she was a commoner - and truly common at that, not even a millionaire's daughter, let alone an untitled member of an aristocratic family; she had a former husband living, whom she had divorced; and a present husband, Ernest Simpson." (189)

Baldwin took the view that as long as Wallis Simpson remained married to Ernest Simpson, the matter could be shelved, however much gossip there might be. The government had an agreement with the owners of Britain's national newspapers not to report on the story. The situation changed when Baldwin heard the news that she was filing a divorce petition (undefended) it was clear that he had to take action. On 20th October he asked the King whether the divorce suit could be withdrawn. It was not, and on 27th October a decree nisi was granted. (190)

Cosmo Gordon Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury also made it clear he was strongly opposed to the king's relationship. Although the king received the political support from Winston Churchill who had been Edward's friend since the 1920s. They played polo together, they regularly dined together and Churchill wrote many of the King's speeches. Churchill put forward his own solution to the dilemma - a morganatic marriage. In other words, the King would marry Simpson but she would not become Queen; she would be made Duchess of Cornwall and the children of the marriage would not inherit the throne. (191)

The two main newspaper barons, Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook, supported the idea and when the King met Baldwin on 25th November, he argued that he was sure the public would support a morganatic marriage. Baldwin disagreed and said the political and religious establishment were strongly opposed to the idea. Baldwin told him: "You may think me Victorian, Sir. You may think my views out of date, but I believe that I know how to interpret the minds of my own people; and I say that, although it is true that standards are lower since the war, it only leads people to expect higher standards from their King. People expect more from their King than they did a hundred years ago." (192)

Sir John Colville, a senior civil servant, later recalled that Beaverbrook pretended to offer the king his support, he really believed that the best solution was to drive Wallis Simpson out of England. This involved a member of his staff paid an Australian assassin to murder Wallis. The same man arranged for threatening letters to be sent to her saying that vitriol would be thrown in her face, a substance which would scar and blind her for life. The letters were passed on to Scotland Yard and they arranged for Wallis to be given extra protection. (193)

Baldwin told the King that the proposed marriage would be unacceptable to him, and if it took place the government would resign. He briefed Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour Party, in confidence on the impending crisis concerned the monarchy. If Attlee opposed Baldwin on this issue he would probably be asked to form a government. Attlee refused to take this opportunity and instead told Baldwin that although he did not object to an American queen, a twice-divorced woman and a morganic marriage was unacceptable. Attlee's critics pointed out that he had shown too great a concern for the monarchy and too little for his party. Attlee saw his duty as clear: "to support the constitutional position taken by Baldwin; to fight an election on the issue would be manifestly opportunistic." (194)

Chamberlain drafted a formal submission for Baldwin to send to the King. It included the following: "The advice of Your Majesty's Government is formally tendered, the the effect that in view of the grave danger to which, in their opinion, this country is being exposed, your association with Mrs Simpson should be terminated forthwith. It is hardly necessary for me to point out that should this advice be tendered and refused by Your Majesty, only one result could follow in accordance with the requirements of constitutional monarchy, that is, the resignation of myself and the government. If Mrs Simpson left the country forthwith, the distasteful matter could be settled in a less formal manner." (195)

Baldwin rejected this approach. He felt that it "offended his sense of emollience and he also realized that, if submitted and published, their clamant discourtesy would almost certainly have the effect of swinging opinion towards the King." Baldwin therefore decided that he would have to have a meeting with the King on 16th November. The King asked the prime minister if his marriage would be approved. He replied that the proposal would not be acceptable to the country, thereby keeping any question of the Government's own veto in the background. (196)

The King responded: "I understand that you and several members of the Cabinet have some fears of a constitutional crisis developing over my friendship with Mrs Simpson. I want you to be the first to know that I have made up my mind and nothing will alter it. I have looked at it from all sides. I mean to abdicate and marry Mrs Simpson." According to Lucy Baldwin her husband said: "Sir, this is a very grave decision and I am deeply grieved." (197)

On 7th December, 1936, Stanley Baldwin told the House of Commons that the King had decided to abdicate: "His Majesty himself in conversation with me some weeks ago when he first informed me of his intention to marry Mrs. Simpson whenever she should be free. The subject has, therefore, been for some time in the King's mind and as soon as His Majesty has arrived at a conclusion as to the course he desires to take he will no doubt communicate it to his Governments in this country and the Dominions. It will then be for those Governments to decide what advice, if any, they would feel it their duty to tender to him in the light of his conclusion." (198)

Winston Churchill jumped up and in emotional terms pleaded for delay. He was ruled out of order by the Speaker for trying to make a speech and shouted down by his fellow MPs, who believed he was simply acting for himself and not the King. The Times described it as "the most striking rebuff of modern parliamentary history". (199) Harold Nicolson, one of his admirers, concluded sadly that "he has undone in five minutes the patient reconstruction work of two years." (200)

Thomas Jones agreed: "The country is split in two, but we shall surmount the cleavage, despite all the efforts of Winston, Beaverbrook, Rothermere and Esmond Harmsworth. The House of Commons has stood firm and of course Winston has sent Stanley Baldwin's stock up by his misguided and persistent questioning about the 'irrevocable step'... The Daily Herald... has taken the strictly constitutional line from the start and published an article by Laski on the Real Issue which has had a stabilising effect on Labour. The Express, Mail, and their evening and picture versions, Mirror, etc. have eclipsed themselves in sentimentality to such an extent as to be ridiculous, one would think, to anyone but a young flapper." (201)

At a meeting with his junior ministers in early 1937 Baldwin told them that they should always treat Labour Party MPs with respect: "Never try to score off the Labour Party or to be smart at their expense. Never do anything to increase the sense of bitterness between the parties in Parliament. Never go out of your way to irritate or anger the Labour Party. Remember that one day we may need them." Baldwin was aware that most Labour MPs had difficulty living on their pay of £200 a year. Almost his final act as Prime Minister was to double their pay and to introduce a salary for the Leader of the Opposition so that he would not need to indulge in what he felt was potentially corrupting work outside Parliament. (202)

Baldwin resigned from office on 28th May, 1937, following the successful coronation celebrations of George VI. After retiring from the House of Commons he was granted the title Earl Baldwin of Bewdley. Baldwin was critical of the government's appeasement policy. He complained to Anthony Eden that his own work "in keeping politics national instead of party" had been rendered worthless by the actions of Neville Chamberlain. Eden replied that Chamberlain was attempting to "return to class warfare in its bitterest form". (203)

Baldwin continued to write to Joan Davidson, who was now the MP for Hemel Hempstead. When he was 72 years old he told her that he was finding life difficult. "I am very lame and hobble about and find it quite a tiring business to get to the Broad Walk (at Astley) and back. I never wished to be younger before or minded the comparative loss of bodily activity. But I do feel being of so little use. There! That's off my chest!" (204)

After the outbreak of the Second World War the public became hostile to both Baldwin and Chamberlain over their appeasement foreign policy in the 1930s. Baldwin was pleased when Winston Churchill became prime minister: "I think he is the right man at the moment and I always did feel that war would be his opportunity. He thrives in that environment." (205)

Baldwin's long-time enemy, Lord Beaverbrook, was Minister of Supply, in 1942, and ordered that the wrought-iron gates that guarded his home, be commandeered for scrap. When this issue was discussed in the House of Commons, Captain Alan Graham, the Conservative M.P. for Wirral said that he was "aware that it is very necessary to leave Lord Baldwin his gates in order to protect him from the just indignation of the mob". (206)

As Roy Jenkins pointed out: "Chamberlain's death left Baldwin more exposed. He became the best available villain for those who wished to fasten upon an individual to blame for Britain's plight. His mail became almost uniformly hostile... Some suggested that the whole estate and house ought to be taken over... He lost nearly all the glow of affection and respect in which he had retired. Most people forgot about him; and the majority of those who did not were unpleasant." (207)

Lucy Baldwin died on 17th June, 1945. Eight days later Baldwin wrote to Joan Davidson: "I have been stunned by what has happened, and realization only follows slowly: I am not a hermit and I perform little duties towards my neighbours, but I have not yet got that control of myself that I must have before I venture forth even amongst my intimate friends." (208)

The following year Baldwin stayed with the Davidsons. On his return he wrote a letter of thanks: "I hated leaving Norcott and I always have to screw myself up to coming back to Astley... My visit was a great joy to me, but I felt you were both working at full stretch and I think you are both carrying out just as much as you can I feel keenly my incapacity to be of any help... The atmosphere in your loved home has done me good, and the memory I always take away with me is very dear to me and for it I bless you... I can't express my feelings as easily as I used to: my pen runs dry and I have to pause for words." (209)

Baldwin stayed at the Davidson's home for the last time in October 1947: "I was very happy at Norcott, as I always am, and I am grateful for much that you said. There are not many left to tell an octogenarian his faults in the spirit of love and not of criticism. I hope that I may improve and be asked again." (210)

Stanley Baldwin died on 14th December 1947.

The Middle Ages

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United States: 1920-1945

(1) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 32

(2) Anne Perkins, Baldwin (2006) page 3

(3) Stanley Baldwin, speech at the Nonconformist Unionist League (8th April 1924)

(4) Stuart Ball, Stanley Baldwin: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (January, 2011)

(5) Robert Blake, Baldwin and the Right, included in John Raymond (editor), The Baldwin Age (1960) page 29

(6) Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin (1999) page 121

(7) Anne Perkins, Baldwin (2006) page 8

(8) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 36

(9) Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters, 1931–1950 (1954)

(10) Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin (1999) page 97

(11) Stuart Ball, Stanley Baldwin: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (January, 2011)

(12) Stanley Baldwin, speech in the House of Commons (3rd March 1908)

(13) Adam Gowans Whyte, Stanley Baldwin (1926) pages 8-10

(14) Stanley Baldwin, speech in the House of Commons (17th March 1909)

(15) Stuart Ball, Stanley Baldwin: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (January, 2011)

(16) Stanley Baldwin, diary entry (4th March, 1918)

(16a) J. C. C. Davidson, (edited by Robert Rhodes James), Memoirs of a Conservative (1969) page 76

(16b) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Elizabeth Dickinson (7th January, 1919)

(16c) Frances Joan Davidson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (3rd September, 2004)

(17) Robert Blake, Baldwin and the Right, included in John Raymond (editor), The Baldwin Age (1960) page 29

(18) Anne Perkins, Baldwin (2006) page 12

(19) Stanley Baldwin, The Times (24th June, 1919)

(20) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 45

(21) Adam Gowans Whyte, Stanley Baldwin (1926) page 14

(22) Peter Rowland, David Lloyd George (1976) page 568

(22a) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 37

(22b) J. C. C. Davidson, (edited by Robert Rhodes James), Memoirs of a Conservative (1969) page 174

(22c) Stuart Ball, J. C. C. Davidson: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (25th September, 2014)

(23) The Evening Standard (12th August, 1922)

(24) Peter Rowland, David Lloyd George (1976) page 572

(25) Anne Perkins, Baldwin (2006) page 19

(26) Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (1970) page 205

(27) Stanley Baldwin, speech at a meeting of Conservative Party members of Parliament (19th October, 1922)

(27a) J. C. C. Davidson, (edited by Robert Rhodes James), Memoirs of a Conservative (1969) pages 127-128

(28) Frederick W. Craig, British General Election Manifestos, 1900-1966 (1970) pages 9-17

(29) Conan Fischer, The Ruhr Crisis, 1923–1924 (2003) pages 28-31

(30) Ewen Green, Andrew Bonar Law : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(31) Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (1970) page 207

(32) Stanley Baldwin, speech in the House of Commons (16th February 1923)

(33) Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law (1955) page 516

(34) J. C. C. Davidson, memorandum sent to Arthur Bigge, 1st Baron Stamfordham, private secretary of King George V (22nd May, 1923)

(35) John C. Davidson, Memoirs of a Conservative (1969) page 157

(36) Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (1970) page 213

(37) Stanley Baldwin, speech in the House of Commons (7th November 1923)

(38) Stuart Ball, Stanley Baldwin: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (January, 2011)

(39) Conservative Party Manifesto (November, 1923)

(40) Labour Party Manifesto (November, 1923)

(41) Robert Shepherd, Westminster: A Biography: From Earliest Times to the Present Day (2012) page 313

(41a) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Joan Davidson (24th December, 1923)

(42) Stanley Baldwin, speech at the Junior Imperial League (3rd May 1924)

(43) G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (1948) page 165

(44) Gill Bennett, Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence (2006) page 82

(45) Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (2009) page 150

(46) A. J. P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945 (1965) pages 289-290

(47) Hamilton Fyfe, Thomas Marlowe : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(48) G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (1948) pages 166-167

(49) Zara S. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (2007) page 173

(50) William D. Rubinstein, Twentieth-Century Britain: A Political History (2003) page 146

(51) Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain: A New History of the Labour Party (2010) page 180

(52) Austen Morgan, J. Ramsay MacDonald (1987) page 118

(53) The Daily Mail (25th October 1924)

(54) A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (1972) page 223

(55) Gill Bennett, Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence (2006) page 82

(56) Desmond Morton, Report on the Zinoviev Letter (27th November, 1924)

(57) Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar: The Churchill-Chamberlain Rivalry (2001) page 137

(58) Roy Jenkins, Churchill (2001) page 404

(59) Winston Churchill, letter to James Gascoyne-Cecil, 4th Marquess of Salisbury (9th December, 1924)

(60) Winston Churchill, letter to James Gascoyne-Cecil, 4th Marquess of Salisbury (27th December, 1924)

(61) Clive Ponting, Winston Churchill (1994) page 304

(62) Winston Churchill, speech in the House of Commons (30th April, 1925)

(63) Thomas Jones, diary entry (17th May, 1925)

(64) Winston Churchill, letter to Arthur Steel-Maitland (19th September, 1925)

(65) Winston Churchill, letter to Stanley Baldwin (20th September, 1925)

(66) Clive Ponting, Winston Churchill (1994) page 305

(67) Frederick A. Macquisten, speech in the House of Commons (6th March, 1925)

(68) Stanley Baldwin, speech in the House of Commons (6th March, 1925)

(69) Will Paynter, My Generation (1972) page 30

(70) Christopher Farman, The General Strike: Britain's Aborted Revolution? (1972) page 40

(71) Tony Lane, The Union Makes us Strong (1974) page 121

(72) Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin (1960) page 277

(73) Anne Perkins, A Very British Strike: 3 May-12 May 1926 (2007) page 53

(74) Margaret Morris, The General Strike (1976) page 127

(75) Julian Symons, The General Strike (1957) page 32

(76) The Samuel Report (11th March, 1926)

(77) Julian Symons, The General Strike (1957) page 35

(78) A. J. Cook, speech (12th March, 1926)

(79) Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diaries: Volume II (1969) page 16

(80) Paul Davies, A. J. Cook (1987) page 95

(81) Margaret Morris, The General Strike (1976) page 214

(82) Hamilton Fyfe, Behind the Scenes of the Great Strike (1926) page 24

(83) Hamilton Fyfe, Thomas Marlowe : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(84) John Hodge, Workman's Cottage to Windsor Castle (1931) page 363

(85) Julian Symons, The General Strike (1957) pages 137-138

(86) Margaret Morris, The General Strike (1976) page 241

(87) John C. Davidson, Memoirs of a Conservative (1969) page 238

(88) Christopher Farman, The General Strike: Britain's Aborted Revolution? (1972) page 190

(89) Stanley Baldwin, BBC broadcast (8th May, 1926)

(90) The Daily Express (12th May, 1926)

(91) The Daily Mirror (12th May, 1926)

(92) The Daily Mail (13th May, 1926)

(93) Paul Davies, A. J. Cook (1987) page 99

(94) Julian Symons, The General Strike (1957) pages 198-199

(95) Margaret Morris, The General Strike (1976) page 263

(96) Frank McLynn, The Road Not Taken: How Britain Narrowly Missed a Revolution (2013) page 461

(97) Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars (1955) page 332

(98) Paul Davies, A. J. Cook (1987) pages 102-103

(99) Anne Perkins, A Very British Strike: 3 May-12 May 1926 (2007) page 255

(100) Paul Foot, An Agitator of the Worst Type (January, 1986)

(101) Will Paynter, My Generation (1972) page 31

(102) Paul Davies, A. J. Cook (1987) page 134

(103) Neville Chamberlain, diary entry (10th August, 1926)

(104) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) pages 104-105

(105) A. J. P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945 (1965) page 318

(106) Julian Symons, The General Strike (1957) page 226

(107) Clive Ponting, Winston Churchill (1994) page 314

(107a) Stuart Ball, J. C. C. Davidson: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (25th September, 2014)

(108) The Daily Mail (28th April, 1928)

(109) Clive Ponting, Winston Churchill (1994) page 314

(110) Millicent Fawcett, diary entry (2nd July 1928)

(110a) Neal R. McCrillis, The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage (1998) page 62

(110b) Mark Pottle, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(110c) J. C. C. Davidson, letter to Sir Charles Hall-Cain (December 1929)

(111) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 107

(112) The Conservative Manifesto: Mr. Stanley Baldwin's Election Address (May, 1929)

(113) The Labour Manifesto: Labour's Appeal to the Nation (May, 1929)

(114) Roy Hattersley, David Lloyd George (2010) page 608

(115) Winston Churchill, letter to David Lloyd George (28th July, 1929)

(115a) J. C. C. Davidson, (edited by Robert Rhodes James), Memoirs of a Conservative (1969) page 301

(115b) J. C. C. Davidson, letter to Samuel Hoare (30th December, 1929)

(115c) Stuart Ball, J. C. C. Davidson: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (25th September, 2014)

(116) Brendan Bracken, letter to Lord Beaverbrook (14th January, 1931)

(117) Lord Beaverbrook, letter to Robert Borden (7th January, 1931)

(118) Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (1992) page 289

(119) The Daily Express (5th, 10th, 11th and 12th December, 1920)

(120) George Ward Price, Sunday Dispatch (5th January, 1930)

(121) Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (1992) page 292

(122) Lord Beaverbrook, letter to Sir Rennell Rodd (6th June, 1930)

(123) The Daily Mail (14th February, 1930)

(124) Robert Bruce Lockhart, diary entry (14th February, 1930)

(125) The Daily Express (18th, 19th, 20th and 26th February, 1930)

(126) Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (1992) page 294

(127) Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the Press (1925) page 9

(128) Tom Driberg, Beaverbrook, A Study in Power and Frustration (1956) pages 206-207

(129) The Daily Express (7th May, 1930)

(130) Iain Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (1961) page 136

(131) Lord Beaverbrook, letter to Alfred Mond, 1st Lord Melchett (22nd September, 1930)

(132) Neville Chamberlain, diary entry (23rd February, 1931)

(133) Peter Neville, Neville Chamberlain (1992) page 51

(134) Robert Blake, Baldwin and the Right, included in John Raymond (editor), The Baldwin Age (1960) page 29

(135) Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (1992) page 299

(136) Stanley Baldwin, letter to John C. Davidson (2nd November, 1930)

(137) A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (1972) page 299

(138) Lord Beaverbrook, letter to Richard Smeaton White (12th November 1930)

(139) Lord Beaverbrook, letter to Lord Rothermere (13th January, 1931)

(140) Lord Rothermere, letter to Lord Beaverbrook (14th January, 1931)

(141) A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (1972) page 304

(142) Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (1992) page 303

(143) Robert Blake, Baldwin and the Right, included in John Raymond (editor), The Baldwin Age (1960) page 52

(144) John Charmley, Duff Copper (1986) page 64

(145) Jeremy Dobson, Why Do the People Hate Me So? (2010) page 182

(146) The Times (18th March, 1931)

(147) Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (1992) page 306

(148) S. J. Taylor, The Great Outsiders: Northcliffe, Rothermere and the Daily Mail (1996) page 274

(149) G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (1948) pages 251-252

(150) David W. Howell, Charles Latham : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(151) William Ashworth, An Economic History of England 1870-1939 (1960) page 39

(152) John Bew, Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee (2016) page 153

(153) A. J. P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945 (1965) pages 366-367

(154) Herbert Samuel, Memoirs (1945) page 204

(155) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Lucy Baldwin (22nd August 1931)

(156) Austen Morgan, J. Ramsay MacDonald (1987) page 198

(157) Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, Attlee: A Life in Politics (2012) page 59

(158) Graham Macklin, Neville Chamberlain (2006) page 30

(159) Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain: A New History of the Labour Party (2010) page 216

(160) Neville Chamberlain, speech in the House of Commons (19th April 1932)

(161) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 124

(162) Neville Chamberlain, diary entry (8th March 1935)

(163) Ramsay MacDonald, diary entry (7th June, 1935)

(164) Neville Chamberlain, letter to Hilda Chamberlain (23rd March, 1935)

(165) Neville Chamberlain, letter to Ida Chamberlain (9th June, 1934)

(166) Graham Macklin, Neville Chamberlain (2006) pages 35-36

(167) Conservative Party Manifesto (November, 1935)

(168) Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, Attlee: A Life in Politics (2012) page 75

(169) Robert Blake, Baldwin and the Right, included in John Raymond (editor), The Baldwin Age (1960) page 25

(170) Iain MacLeod, Neville Chamberlain (1961) page 178

(171) Robert Sheppard, A Class Divided: Appeasement and the Road to Munich (1988) page 115

(172) Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar: The Churchill-Chamberlain Rivalry (2001) page 213

(173) Stanley Baldwin, speech in the House of Commons (12th November, 1936)

(174) Anne Perkins, Baldwin (2006) page 90

(175) Hugh Dalton, diary entry (26th November, 1935)

(176) Harold Laski, Manchester Guardian (9th October, 1935)

(177) Michael Jago, Clement Attlee (2017) page 104

(178) Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (1986) page 163

(179) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Winston Churchill (28th July 1936)

(180) Thomas Jones, diary entry (21st January, 1936)

(181) Henry Channon, diary entry (10th June, 1935)

(182) Charles Higham, Wallis: Secret Lives of the Duchess of Windsor (1988) page 151

(183) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 146

(184) Keith Middlemas, Baldwin (1970) page 979

(185) A. J. P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945 (1965) page 490

(186) Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (1962) page 345

(187) Roy Hattersley, Borrowed Time: The Story of Britain Between the Wars (2007) page 96

(188) Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War (1998) page 27

(189) A. J. P. Taylor, English History: 1914-1945 (1965) page 490

(190) Robert Blake, Baldwin and the Right, included in John Raymond (editor), The Baldwin Age (1960) page 62

(191) Clive Ponting, Winston Churchill (1994) page 382

(192) John Gilbert Lockhart, Cosmo Gordon Lang (1949) page 399

(193) Charles Higham, Wallis: Secret Lives of the Duchess of Windsor (1988) page 178

(194) Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain: A New History of the Labour Party (2010) page 225

(195) Frances Donaldson, Edward VIII (1974) page 238

(196) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) pages 150-151

(197) Roy Hattersley, Borrowed Time: The Story of Britain Between the Wars (2007) page 104

(198) Stanley Baldwin, speech in the House of Commons (7th December, 1936)

(199) The Times (8th December, 1936)

(200) Harold Nicolson, diary entry (8th December, 1936)

(201) Thomas Jones, diary entry (8th December, 1936)

(202) Anne Perkins, Baldwin (2006) page 136

(203) David Faber, Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis (2008) pages 169-170

(204) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Joan Davidson (4th September, 1939)

(205) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Joan Davidson (22nd June, 1940)

(206) Captain Alan Graham, speech in the House of Commons (4th March, 1942)

(207) Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (1987) page 165

(208) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Joan Davidson (25th June, 1945)

(209) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Joan Davidson (26th March, 1946)

(210) Stanley Baldwin, letter to Joan Davidson (28th October, 1947)