Henderson was posted to Constantinople in October 1920. The ambassador was Sir Horace Rumbold, who appreciated Henderson's capacity for "jujitsu diplomacy". He also spent time in Cairo before returning to Paris in April 1928. The following year he was posted to Belgrade where he developed a close relationship with King Alexander. When he was assassinated during a visit to France, Henderson wrote to Robert Vansittart that he felt more emotion at his funeral than "at any other except my mother's". (3)

Henderson was a man of strong opinions and he was accused of being too partial towards the host country. The government minister, Hugh Dalton, stated on meeting him "Ah, here's the pro-Yugoslav". Henderson commented in his memoirs, Water Under the Bridge (1945), that this comment irritated him intensely. (4)

In October 1935 he became ambassador in Buenos Aires. However, he was disappointed with the post as he expected to be given one of the more important jobs in the civil service. In 1937, some of his pro-appeasement friends in government, began suggesting that he should replace Eric Phipps, the ambassador to Berlin. Phipps had been warning of the dangers of Adolf Hitler and in his reports he gave ample and frequent warning of Nazi intentions to his superiors in London. He argued that Germany could only be contained "through accelerated and extensive British rearmament". (5)

Stanley Baldwin was urged to remove Phipps because he had a poor relationship with Hitler. It was suggested that Henderson had a good reputation for dealing with dictators. Henderson was recalled to London where he had a meeting with Neville Chamberlain. At the time, Chamberlain was Chancellor of the Exchequer, but was told that he would soon become Prime Minister. Chamberlain, a great supporter of appeasement, urged Henderson to "take the line of co-operation with Germany". (6) Henderson later recalled that Chamberlain "outlined to me his views on general policy towards Germany, and I think I may honestly say that to the last and bitter end I followed the general line which he set me." (7)

Before leaving for Germany, Nevile Henderson read a copy of Hitler's Mein Kampf. "Though it was in parts turgid and prolix and would have been more readable if it had been condensed to a third of its length, it struck me at the time as a remarkable production on the part of a man whose education and political experience appeared to have been as slight, on his own showing, as Herr Hitler's." (8)

On 1st June, 1937, Henderson attended a banquet arranged by the German-English Society of Berlin. A large number of leading Nazis were in attendance when he made a speech where he defended Adolf Hitler and urged the British people to "lay less stress on Nazi dictatorship and much more emphasis on the great social experiment which is being tried out in this country." (9)

This speech provoked an uproar and some left-wing journalists described him as "our Nazi ambassador at Berlin". However, some newspaper editors, including Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times, who supported this approach to Nazi Germany. In the House of Commons the Conservative Party MP, Alfred Knox offered congratulations "to HM Ambassador in Berlin on having made a real contribution to the cause of peace". (10) Richard Griffiths, the author of Fellow Travellers of the Right (1979), has pointed out that "Henderson was not just an eccentric individual, as has been suggested; he stands as an example of a whole trend in British thought at the time." (11)

Nevile Henderson also received support from the House of Lords and Henry Wilson, Bishop of Chelmsford, the fervent anti-Communist, who praised Henderson's attempt to develop a better relationship with Germany: "I am perfectly certain that it is only an insignificant minority of our people who do not long for friendship and goodwill between ourselves and the German people, and I can truthfully say, I do not number among my friends any person who does not regard with horror and dismay the possibility of any serious misunderstanding between ourselves and the Germans. The whole world lies under a great debt to the German people; it is quite true to say their achievements are regarded with admiration in this country." (12)

Nevile Henderson developed a good relationship with Hitler: "In democratic England the Nazis, with their disregard of personal freedom and their persecution of religion, Jews, and trade unions alike, were naturally far from popular. But they were the Government of the country, and an ambassador is not sent abroad to criticise in that country the government which it chooses or to whom it submits. It was just as much my duty honourably to try to co-operate with the Nazi Government to the best of my ability as it would be for a foreign ambassador in London to work with a Conservative Government, if it happened to be in power, rather than with the Liberal or Labour opposition." (13)

Sir Robert Vansittart, was Henderson's boss at the Foreign Office. He was a strong opponent of Hitler and strongly disagreed with the government policy of appeasement. He criticised Henderson's decision to attend the annual Nuremberg Rally and objected to a memorandum written in May 1937 that suggested that Britain should not object to Germany's desire to take action against countries in Eastern Europe. (14)

Henderson told Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, that he would be regarded as "too pro-Nazi or pro-German". However, he believed that sometimes it was necessary to impose a dictatorship. He considered Antonio Salazar, "the present dictator of Portugal" one of the "wisest statesmen which the post-war period has produced in Europe". He argued that Hitler had probably gone too far with the Nuremberg Laws but "dictatorships are not always evil and, however anathema the principle may be to us, it is unfair to condemn a whole country, or even a whole system. because parts of it are bad." (15)

Henderson admitted in his autobiography, Failure of a Mission (1940), that his comments gave "most offence to the left wing". However, he believed that that the British people should pay more "attention to the great social experiment which was being tried out in Germany" and condemned those who suggested that "our old democracy has nothing to learn from Nazism". Henderson argued that "in fact, many things in the Nazi organisation and social institutions... which we might study and adapt to our own use with great profit both to the health and happiness of our own nation and old democracy." (16)

Henderson compared the Hitler Youth to the British boy scout movement. "I am no educational expert, but roughly the education of the average German boy proceeds along the following course. At six he goes to the elementary or day school, and at, seven he joins the Jungvolk or junior branch of the Hitler Jugend (Youth). Much of the training in the Jungvolk corresponds to that of our boy scouts, but he also gets there political lectures on National-Socialist lines (i.e., on the doctrines of racial superiority and national self-sufficiency), as well as training in target-shooting. The musket is, in fact, put on his shoulder at the age of seven. At the age of fourteen and until eighteen it is compulsory for boys to join the Hitler Jugend itself, in which this politico-military education is intensified." (17)

Henderson especially liked the Nazi system of Labour Service: "To my own countrymen I would, for instance, particularly recommend the labour camps. Between the age of seventeen and nineteen every German boy, rich or poor, the son of a labourer or of a former reigning Prince, is obliged to spend six months in a labour camp, building roads, draining marshland, felling trees, or doing whatever other manual labour may be required in his area. In my humble opinion these camps serve none but useful purposes. In them not only are there no class distinctions, but there is, on the contrary, an opportunity for better understanding between the classes. Therein one learns the pleasure of hard work and the dignity of labour, as well as the benefits of discipline; moreover, they vastly improve the physique of the nation. The average weight which a German boy puts on during those six months is thirteen German pounds, or a little over a stone of bone and muscle." (18)

He also praised Hitler for reducing unemployment: "He (Hitler) had restored to Germany her self-respect, and recreated orderliness out of the chaos and distress which had followed her defeat in 1918... In 1933, ten per cent - over six million men - of the population of Germany were out of work. Within four years the number of unemployed had been reduced to an infinitesimal figure, and by 1939 there was a labour shortage estimated at two million. That in itself, however much one may attribute it to war production, was no mean achievement." (19)

Henderson approved of the simple way that Hitler lived. Unlike the other Nazi leaders he was not corrupt or of "doubtful honesty". For this reason he was liked by the German people: "The others may have provided for themselves nest-eggs abroad, but Hitler would certainly not have done so... He (Hitler) drank no wine, he did not smoke, and he ate no meat." (20)

Henderson pointed out that Hitler had tremendous control over the German people: "Many Germans, women in particular, used to descant to me upon the radiance of his expression and his remarkable eyes. When I looked into the latter they were generally hot and angry. That was possibly my misfortune, since I only saw him on official occasions; but I must confess that, in spite of his achievements, which no one could belittle, he never, on that first occasion or later, gave me any impression of greatness. He was a spell-binder for his own people. That is self-evident; nor was there any doubt about his capacity to charm, if he set himself out to do so... In his reasonable moods I was often disconcerted by the sanity and logic of his arguments, but when he became excited, which was the mood which most influenced his countrymen, I had, but, one inclination, which to beg him to calm down." (21)

Rudolf Hess was an important figure in the Nazi government: "Tall and dark, with beetling eyebrows, a famous smile and ingratiating manners, Hess was perhaps the most attractive looking of the leading Nazis. He was not inclined to be talkative, and in conversation did not convey the impression of great ability. But people who knew him best would have agreed that first impressions - and I never got further with him than that - were deceptive, and he certainly wielded in Germany more influence than people generally believed. I would have summed him up as aloof and inscrutable, with a strong fanatical streak which would be produced whenever the occasion required it." (22)

Henderson had regular meetings with Joseph Goebbels. Although some British newspapers, such as the Daily Mail and The Times, were supportive of the Nazi government, others such as the Manchester Guardian, Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mirror, were often critical of the regime. Goebbels often berated Henderson about this but the "press problem remained insoluble" but Goebbels remained "friendly and sensible".

According to Henderson: "Goebbels was probably the most intelligent, from a purely brain point of view, of all the Nazi leaders. He never speechified; he always saw and stuck to the point; he was an able debater and, in private conversation, astonishingly fair-minded and reasonable. Personally, whenever I had the chance, I found pleasure in talking to him. In appearance and in character he was a typical little Irish agitator, and was, in fact, probably of Celtic origin. He came from the Rhineland and had been educated in a Jesuit school. He was a slip of a man, but, in spite of his slight deformity, he had given proof of great courage when he fought the Communists in Berlin and won the capital for Hitler and Nazism. When, however, he was on a public platform or had a pen in his hand no gall was too bitter and no lie too blatant for him." (23)

The man who Henderson most admired was Hermann Göring: "Of all the big Nazi leaders, Hermann Göring was for me by far the most sympathetic. He may have been the man who was chiefly responsible for the firing of the Reichstag in 1933, and he certainly was the one to whom, as his most trusted adherent, Hitler confided the task of cleaning up Berlin at the time of the Röhm purge in 1934. In any crisis, as in war, he would be quite ruthless. He once said to me that the British whom he really admired were those whom he described as the pirates, such as Francis Drake, and he reproached us for having become too 'debrutalised'. He was, in fact, himself a typical and brutal buccaneer, but he had certain attractive qualities, and I must frankly say that I had a real personal liking for him." (24)

Nevile Henderson constantly warned the British government that Germany was building up its armed forces. In January 1938 he reported: "The rearmament of Germany, if it has been less spectacular because it is no longer news, has been pushed on with the same energy as in previous years. In the army, consolidation has been the order of the day, but there is clear evidence that a considerable increase is being prepared in the number of divisions and of additional tank units outside those divisions. The air force continues to expand, at an alarming rate, and one can at present see no indication of a halt. We may well soon be faced with a strength of between 4000 and 5000 first-line aircraft. The power of the German air force has been still further increased by the intensive development of air defence, which has reached a degree of efficiency probably unknown in any other country... Finally, the mobilisation of the civilian population and industry for war, by means of education, propaganda, training, and administrative measures, has made further strides. Military efficiency is the god to whom everyone must offer sacrifice. It is not an army, but the whole German nation which is being prepared for war." (25)

Although he retained the confidence of Neville Chamberlain, the Foreign Office considered him to be "too weak, too vain, too shallow, Henderson was regarded by most of his professional colleagues as being excessively susceptible to Nazi pressure". A member of the Cliveden Set, he told his friends that he was taking his instructions from 10 Downing Street and not the Foreign Office. He told Geoffrey Dawson: "Neville has outlined to me his thoughts on a German-European settlement. I can discharge this policy faithfully and with the utmost ease as it corresponds so closely with my private conceptions." (26)

Henderson believed that Britain would lose a war with Nazi Germany. He therefore recommended that the British government should apply pressure on President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia to give up the Sudetenland, with its largely German-speaking population, to Germany. Henderson's biographer, Peter Neville, pointed out: "So strong was this conviction that he sometimes erred on the side of prejudice against the Czechs and their president, Beneš". (27)

In September 1938, Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, met Hitler at his home in Berchtesgaden. Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Britain supported Germany's plans to takeover the Sudetenland. After discussing the issue with the Edouard Daladier (France) and Eduard Benes (Czechoslovakia), Chamberlain informed Hitler that his proposals were unacceptable. (28)

Henderson pleaded with Chamberlain to go on negotiating with Hitler. He believed, like Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, that the German claim to the Sudetenland in 1938 was a moral one, and he always reverted in his dispatches to his conviction that the Treaty of Versailles had been unfair to Germany. "At the same time, he was unsympathetic to feelers from the German opposition to Hitler seeking to enlist British support. Henderson thought, not unreasonably, that it was not the job of the British government to subvert the German government, and this view was shared by Chamberlain and Halifax". (29)

Benito Mussolini suggested to Hitler that one way of solving this issue was to hold a four-power conference of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. This would exclude both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and therefore increasing the possibility of reaching an agreement and undermine the solidarity that was developing against Germany. The meeting took place in Munich on 29th September, 1938. Desperate to avoid war, and anxious to avoid an alliance with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union, Chamberlain and Daladier agreed that Germany could have the Sudetenland. In return, Hitler promised not to make any further territorial demands in Europe. (30)

The meeting ended with Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini signing the Munich Agreement which transferred the Sudetenland to Germany. "We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as Symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries." (31)

Nevile Henderson defended the agreement: "Germany thus incorporated the Sudeten lands in the Reich without bloodshed and without firing a shot. But she had not got all that Hitler wanted and which she would have got if the arbitrament had been left to war... The humiliation of the Czechs was a tragedy, but it was solely thanks to Mr. Chamberlain's courage and pertinacity that a futile and senseless war was averted." (32)

Most of the newspapers agreed. For example, the Daily Express reported: "Be glad in your hearts. Give thanks to your God. People of Britain, your children are safe. Your husbands and your sons will not march to war Peace is a victory for all mankind. If we must have a victor, let us choose Chamberlain. For the Prime Minister's conquests are mighty and enduring - millions of happy homes and hearts relieved of their burden. To him the laurels. And now let us go back to our own affairs. We have had enough of those menaces, conjured up from the Continent to confuse us." (33)

Some newspapers such as the The Manchester Guardian criticised the agreement. "If Germany's aim were the economic and financial destruction of Czechoslovakia the Munich agreement goes far to satisfy her. But, it may be urged, while the Czechs may suffer economically, they have the political protection of an international guarantee. What is it worth? Will Britain and France (and Russia, though, of course, Russia was not even mentioned at Munich) come to the aid of an unarmed Czechoslovakia when they would not help her in her strength? Politically Czechoslovakia is rendered helpless, with all that that means to the balance of forces in Eastern Europe, and Hitler will be able to advance again, when he chooses, with greatly increased power." (34) Henderson wrote to Chamberlain and told him to ignore these comments: "Millions of mothers will be blessing your name tonight for having saved their sons from the horrors of war. Oceans of ink will flow hereafter in criticism of your action." (35)

Opponents of appeasement, in the Conservative Party such as Robert Boothby, were appalled by what had happened: "The terms of the Munich Agreement turned out to be even worse than we had supposed. They amounted to unconditional surrender. Even Göring was shocked. He said afterwards that when he heard Hitler tell the conference at Munich (if such it could be called) that he proposed to occupy the Sudeten lands, including the Czech fortifications at once... But neither Chamberlain nor Daladier made a cheep of protest. Hitler did not even have to send an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain did that for him." (36)

In the debate that took place in the House of Commons on 3rd October, 1938, Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour Party, stated: "We all feel relief that war has not come this time. Every one of us has been passing through days of anxiety; we cannot, however, feel that peace has been established, but that we have nothing but an armistice in a state of war. We have been unable to go in for care-free rejoicing. We have felt that we are in the midst of a tragedy. We have felt humiliation. This has not been a victory for reason and humanity. It has been a victory for brute force. At every stage of the proceedings there have been time limits laid down by the owner and ruler of armed force. The terms have not been terms negotiated; they have been terms laid down as ultimata. We have seen to day a gallant, civilised and democratic people betrayed and handed over to a ruthless despotism. We have seen something more. We have seen the cause of democracy, which is, in our view, the cause of civilisation and humanity, receive a terrible defeat... The events of these last few days constitute one of the greatest diplomatic defeats that this country and France have ever sustained. There can be no doubt that it is a tremendous victory for Herr Hitler. Without firing a shot, by the mere display of military force, he has achieved a dominating position in Europe which Germany failed to win after four years of war. He has overturned the balance of power in Europe. He has destroyed the last fortress of democracy in Eastern Europe which stood in the way of his ambition." (37)

On 6th October, 1938, Henderson wrote privately to Lord Halifax asking him to "move me to some other sphere. I never want to work with Germans again". (38) However, his request for a transfer was refused, although by now cancer of the throat had been diagnosed by his doctors. He was now forced to return to London. (39) "Within a couple of weeks I was operated upon in a nursing-home, and for four months altogether I remained completely out of everything." (40)

Nevile Henderson returned to Berlin in February 1939. According to Peter Neville: "In the light of Henderson's poor health, it was an extraordinary decision by the Foreign Office to send him back to Berlin. Halifax had lost faith in him, as had the new permanent under-secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and the failure to recall him seemed even more bizarre after Hitler's occupation of Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939. Henderson himself recognized... that it would have been wiser to have recalled him, because of his close association with the appeasement policy which had been dealt a fatal blow by Hitler's illegal act." (41)

The German Army seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. In taking this action Adolf Hitler broke the Munich Agreement. "Prague, a sorrowing Prague, yesterday had its first day of German rule - a day in which the Czechs learned of the details of their subjection to Germany, and in which the Germans began their measures against the Jews... Bridges were occupied by troops and each bridge-head had a heavy machine-gun mounted on a tripod and pointing to the sky. Every twenty yards along the pavement two machine-guns were mounted facing each other. Suicides have begun. The fears of the Jews grow. The funds of the Jewish community have been seized, stopping Jewish relief work. The organization for Jewish emigration has been closed." (42)

Nevile Henderson was devastated by Hitler's action: "Hitler had staged another of his lightning coups, and once more the world was left breathless... By the occupation of Prague, Hitler put himself once for all morally and unquestionably in the wrong, and destroyed the entire arguable validity of the German case as regards the Treaty of Versailles... By his callous destruction of the hard and newly won liberty of a free and independent people, Hitler deliberately violated the Munich Agreement, which he had signed not quite six months before, and his undertaking to Mr. Chamberlain, once the Sudetenlands had been incorporated in the Reich, to respect the independence and integrity of the Czech people." (43)

Henderson tried vainly to convince the Germans that an attack on Poland would mean war. It is reported that he had "shouting matches" with Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop in late August, 1939. On the day war broke out, it was Henderson's duty to present the British ultimatum to Hitler. He returned to England a few days later. His worsening health forced him to retire from the diplomatic service in January 1940. Later that year he published his memoirs, Failure of a Mission. (44)

Nevile Henderson died on 30th December, 1942.

Adolf Hitler's Early Life (Answer Commentary)

Adolf Hitler and the First World War (Answer Commentary)

Adolf Hitler and the German Workers' Party (Answer Commentary)

Sturmabteilung (SA) (Answer Commentary)

Adolf Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (Answer Commentary)

Adolf Hitler the Orator (Answer Commentary)

An Assessment of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (Answer Commentary)

British Newspapers and Adolf Hitler (Answer Commentary)

Lord Rothermere, Daily Mail and Adolf Hitler (Answer Commentary)

Adolf Hitler v John Heartfield (Answer Commentary)

The Hitler Youth (Answer Commentary)

German League of Girls (Answer Commentary)

Night of the Long Knives (Answer Commentary)

The Political Development of Sophie Scholl (Answer Commentary)

The White Rose Anti-Nazi Group (Answer Commentary)

Kristallnacht (Answer Commentary)

Heinrich Himmler and the SS (Answer Commentary)

Trade Unions in Nazi Germany (Answer Commentary)

Hitler's Volkswagen (The People's Car) (Answer Commentary)

Women in Nazi Germany (Answer Commentary)

The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich (Answer Commentary)

The Last Days of Adolf Hitler (Answer Commentary)

(1) Peter Neville, Nevile Henderson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(2) A. J. P. Taylor, British History 1914-1945 (1965) page 184

(3) Nevile Henderson, letter to Robert Vansittart (28th February, 1935)

(4) Nevile Henderson, Water Under the Bridge (1945) page 171

(5) G. T. Waddington, Eric Phipps : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(6) Keith Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion: British Government and Germany, 1937-39 (1972) page 53

(7) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 17

(8) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 14

(9) Neville Henderson, speech in Berlin (1st June, 1937)

(10) Alfred Knox, speech in House of Commons (9th June 1937)

(11) Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right (1979) page 283

(12) Henry Wilson, Bishop of Chelmsford, Anglo-German Review (August 1937)

(13) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 16

(14) Peter Neville, Nevile Henderson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(15) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 21

(16) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 23

(17) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 32

(18) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 24

(19) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 39

(20) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 44

(21) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 49

(22) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 72

(23) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 76

(24) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 80

(25) Neville Henderson, report to the British government (January 1938)

(26) Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity (2000) pages 172-173

(27) Peter Neville, Nevile Henderson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(28) A. J. P. Taylor, British History 1914-1945 (1965) page 527

(29) Peter Neville, Nevile Henderson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(30) Graham Darby, Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War (1999) page 56

(31) Statement issued by Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler after the signing of the Munich Agreement (30th September, 1938)

(32) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 167

(33) The Daily Express (30th September, 1938)

(34) The Manchester Guardian (1st October, 1938)

(35) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 168

(36) Robert Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel Hardcover (1978) page 130

(37) Clement Attlee, speech in the House of Commons (3rd October, 1938)

(38) Neville Henderson, letter to Lord Halifax (6th October, 1938)

(39) Peter Neville, Nevile Henderson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(40) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 171

(41) Peter Neville, Nevile Henderson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)

(42) The Manchester Guardian (17th March, 1939)

(43) Neville Henderson, Failure of a Mission (1940) page 209

(44) Peter Neville, Nevile Henderson : Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004-2014)