On 25th October, 1912, A. P. Izvolsky, Russian ambassador to Paris, informed Foreign Minister Sazonov of the following statement of policy adopted by the French Cabinet: "France now recognizes that Austria's territorial ambitions involve the over-all balance of power in Europe and consequently France's own interests."

In short, France was encouraging Russia to take a stronger stand in the Balkans. At about the same time France began pressing Russia to strengthen the construction of strategically important railroads without delay.

At this time the Tsar nor his army had any doubt (that if there was a war) of the ultimate victory of the Triple Entente, and Nicholas played at the then fashionable game of redividing up the world. Russia must receive Posen, part of Silesia, Galicia and North Bukovina which will permit her to reach her natural limit, the Carpathians. The Turks were to be driven from Europe; the Northern Straits might be Bulgarian, but the environs of Constantinople - Sazonov had not yet asked for the city itself - must be in the hands of Russia.

Serbia has only gone through the first stage of her historic road and for the attainment of her goal must still endure a terrible struggle in which her whole existence may be at stake. Serbia's promised land lies in the territory of present-day Hungary and not in the direction in which she is now tending and where Bulgaria stands in her way. In these circumstances it is a vital interest of Serbia on the one hand to uphold the alliance with Bulgaria and on the other by tenacious and patient effort to attain the necessary degree of preparedness for the future inevitable struggle.

The peace of the world will only be secure on the day when the Triple Entente, whose real existence is not better authenticated than the existence of the sea serpent, shall transform itself into a defensive alliance without secret clauses and publicly announced in all the world press. On that day the danger of a German hegemony will be finally removed, and each one of us will be able to devote himself quietly to his own affairs.

I had a vivid recollection of the impression produced everywhere, and especially in Germany, by Mr. Lloyd George's speech in 1911 when, owing to the Agadir incident, Europe was on the brink of war. A decisive statement on the part of the British Government of its solidarity with France had then been sufficient to dispel the gathering storm clouds. I was profoundly convinced at the time and am still convinced now that, had the British Government sided with Russia and France on the Serbian question from the first, Berlin would not have encouraged Austria in its policy of aggression, but would on the contrary have advised caution and moderation, and the hour of reckoning between the two hostile camps into which Europe was divided would have been postponed for years if not for ever.

There was no more hope of preserving peace. All our conciliatory offers, which went far beyond anything that a Great Power, whose resources were still untouched, could be expected to concede, had been rejected. The same thing happened about the offers made, with our consent, by Sir Edward Grey, which proved that the British Government was no less peaceably disposed than ourselves. I told the Tsar that it was dangerous to delay the general mobilisation any longer, since, according to the information they possessed, the German mobilisation, though not as yet proclaimed officially, was fairly advanced. The perfection of the German military organisation made it possible by means of personal notices to the reservists to accomplish a great part of the work quietly and then, after the formal orders have been issued, to complete the mobilisation in a very short time. This circumstance gave a tremendous advantage to Germany, but we could counteract it to a certain extent by taking measures for our own mobilisation in good time. The Tsar knew all this very well and he signified it by inclining his head without speaking.

In the circumstances there was nothing left for the Tsar but to give orders for general mobilisation. The Tsar was silent. Then he said to me, in a voice full of deep feeling: "This would mean sending hundreds of thousands of Russian people to their death. How can one help hesitating to take such a step?" I answered that the responsibility for the precious lives carried away by the war would not fall upon him. Neither he nor his government desired the war thrust upon Russia and Europe by the ill-will of the enemy, determined to increase their power by enslaving our natural Allies in the Balkans, destroying our influence there and reducing Russia to a pitiful dependence upon the arbitrary will of the Central Powers.

On January 19, Goremykin was replaced by Sturmer, an extreme reactionary who hated the very idea of any form of popular representation or local self-government. Even more important, he was undoubtedly a believer in the need for an immediate cessation of the war with Germany.

During his first few months in office, Sturmer was also Minister of Interior, but the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was still held by Sazonov, who firmly advocated honouring the alliance with Britain and France and carrying on the war to the bitter end, and who recognized the Cabinet's obligation to pursue a policy in tune with the sentiments of the majority in the Duma.

On August 9, however, Sazonov was suddenly dismissed. His portfolio was taken over by Sturmer, and on September 16, Protopopov was appointed acting Minister of the Interior. The official government of the Russian Empire was now entirely in the hands of the Tsarina and her advisers.