Thomas C. Mann

Thomas Clinton Mann was born in Laredo, Texas, on 11th November, 1912. Mann went to Baylor University in 1929 and graduated five years later. In 1934 he began work as a lawyer in Texas.

In 1942 Mann joined the Department of State and held various diplomatic posts in Uruguay (1942-43) and Venezuela (1947-49) before being appointed director of the State Department's Office of Inter-American Affairs.

In the summer of 1950, Tommy Corcoran, who worked for United Fruit Company, went to see Mann in his office in Washington. Corcoran told Mann he was worried that Jacobo Arbenz would win the forthcoming election in Guatemala. He asked Mann: "Does our government have any program for bringing about the election of a middle-of-the-road candidate in Guatemala?" According to Mann, he replied: "No, we don't. That is for the people of that country to decide."

In 1953 Mann was appointed to a post in the U.S. Embassy in Greece. Two weeks after the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala Mann arrived in the country as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy

In September 1955 President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Mann as the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. In October 1957 Mann became Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He also held the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (August 1960 - January 1961).

Mann had been a long-time friend of Lyndon B. Johnson and in 1961 he persuaded President John F. Kennedy to appoint him as Ambassador to Mexico. In this post he developed a close relationship with Winston Scott, the CIA chief in Mexico City. He also successfully negotiated a settlement of a boundary dispute between Mexico and the U.S.

Mann worked very closely with the military government of Adolfo Lopez Mateos. Mann told the president via Winston Scott that the U.S. administration was willing to provide covert assistance to help anti-communist groups in Mexico.

At 11.00 a.m. on Friday, 27th September, 1963, a young American entered the Cuban consul's office. He told Silvia Duran that his name was Lee Harvey Oswald and that he needed a Cuban transit visa. Oswald told Duran that he planned to leave in three days' time and stay in Cuba for a couple of weeks. He then intended to move onto the Soviet Union. To establish his identity Oswald showed Duran her his passport, correspondence with the American Communist Party, his membership card for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a newspaper clipping about his activities in New Orleans and a photograph of Oswald in custody, accompanied by two police officers.

Silvia Duran was suspicious of Lee Harvey Oswald. She could not understand why Oswald had not applied in advance by contacting the Communist Party in Cuba. Duran told him that he would need a passport photograph to apply for a visa for Cuba. He returned an hour later with the photograph. Duran then told Oswald she could not issue a transit visa without confirmation that he had clearance for travel to the Soviet Union. Oswald was told it would be at least seven days before his transit visa could be issued. Oswald replied that he could only stay for three days.

Duran told Lee Harvey Oswald he would need to visit the Soviet embassy to get the necessary paperwork. This he did but Vice Consul Oleg Nechiperenko informed him that the visa application would be sent to the Soviet embassy in Washington and would take about four months. Oswald then returned to the Cuban consulate at 4.00 and told Duran that he had been to the Soviet Embassy and that they were willing to give him a visa straight away. Duran phoned the embassy and was told that Oswald was lying and that the visa would not be issued for some time. After a brief argument Oswald left the consulate. Six times Oswald needed to pass the newly installed CIA camera as part of the LIERODE operation.

The CIA surveillance program worked and on Monday, 30th September, Anne Goodpasture recorded details of Oswald’s visits to the Cuban consulate. As Goodpasture noted, the two types of “security” information that most interested the CIA station concerned “U.S. citizens initiating or maintaining contact with the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic installations” and “travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens or residents.”

Assassination of John F. Kennedy Encyclopedia

The CIA tape of the Oswald call to the Soviet embassy was marked “urgent” and was delivered to the station within 15 minutes of it taking place. Winston Scott read Goodpasture’s report and next to the transcript of Duran’s call to the Soviet embassy, he wrote: “Is it possible to identify”.

It later emerged that the CIA station in Mexico was already monitoring Silvia Duran. According to Winston Scott and David Atlee Phillips, the CIA surveillance program had revealed that Duran was having an affair with Carlos Lechuga, the former Cuban ambassador in Mexico City, who was in 1963 serving as Castro’s ambassador to the United Nations.

When Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested in Dallas shortly after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Duran immediately recognized him as the man who visited the Cuban consul's office on 27th September. This was reinforced by the discovery of Duran's name and phone number in Oswald's address book. However, Eusebio Azcue, another man who met Oswald in the office, said the man had dark blond hair and had features quite different from those of the man arrested in Dallas.

The CIA tape of the Oswald call to the Soviet embassy was marked “urgent” and was delivered to the station within 15 minutes of it taking place. Scott read Goodpasture’s report and next to the transcript of Duran’s call to the Soviet embassy, he wrote: “Is it possible to identify”. Winston Scott passed this information on to Mann. Scott recorded what happened in his unpublished autobiography: "Every piece of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: U.S. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann, by memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico, by memorandum; and to my headquarters by cable; and included in each and every one of these reports was the entire conversation Oswald had, from Cuban Consulate, with the Soviet Embassy".

Soon after the assassination of John F. Kennedy Scott contacted Luis Echeverria and asked his men to arrest Silvia Duran. He also told Diaz Ordaz that Duran was to be held incommunicado until she gave all details of her contacts with Lee Harvey Oswald. Scott then reported his actions to CIA headquarters. Soon afterwards, John M. Whitten, the CIA head of the Mexican desk, called Scott with orders from Tom Karamessines that Duran was not to be arrested. Win told them it was too late and that the Mexican government would keep the whole thing secret. Karamessines replied with a telegram that began: “Arrest of Sylvia Duran is extremely serious matter which could prejudice U.S. freedom of action on entire question of Cuban responsibility.”

Silvia Duran, her husband and five other people were arrested. Duran was “interrogated forcefully” (Duran was badly bruised during the interview). Luis Echeverria reported to Winston Scott that Duran had been “completely cooperative” and had made a detailed statement. This statement matched the story of the surveillance transcripts, with one exception. The tapes indicated that Duran made another call to the Soviet embassy on Saturday, 28th September. Duran then put an American on the line who spoke incomprehensible Russian. This suggests that the man could not have been Oswald who spoke the language well.

Mann sent a message to Winston Scott that stated: "Duran should be told that as the only living non-Cuban who knew the full story, she was in exactly the same position as Oswald prior to the assassination. Her only chance of survival is to come clean with the whole story and cooperate fully. I think she'll crack when confronted with the details."

On 25th November, Gilberto Alvarado, a 23 year-old Nicaraguan man, contacted the U.S. embassy in Mexico City and said he had some important information about Lee Harvey Oswald. Thomas Mann passed the information onto Winston Scott and the following morning, Scott's deputy, Alan White and another CIA officer interviewed Alvarado. He claimed that during a visit to the Cuban Embassy he overheard a man he now recognised as Oswald, talking to a red-haired Negro man. According to Alvarado, Oswald said something about being man enough to kill someone. He also claimed that he saw money changing hands. He reported the information at the time to the U.S. Embassy but they replied: "Quit wasting our time. We are working here, not playing."

Winston Scott told David Atlee Phillips about what Gilberto Alvarado had said to Alan White. On 26th November, Phillips had a meeting with Alvarado in a safe-house. Avarado told Phillips that the red-haired black man had given Oswald $1,500 for expenses and $5,500 as an advance. Although he was not sure of the date, he thought it was about 18th September.

Mann and David Atlee Phillips believed Alvarado but Winston Scott was not so sure. He argued that there was an "outside possibility" that it might be a set-up by the right-wing government in Nicaragua who wanted the United States to invade Cuba. However, as Jefferson Morley pointed out in Our Man in Mexico: "The unstated message emanating from the White House was by now clear to Win - though not to Mann. Speculation about Oswald's motives was to be cut off, not pursued."

On 27th November, Luis Echeverria told Winston Scott that they had rearrested Silvia Duran because she was trying to leave Mexico for Cuba. Mann sent a message to Scott that stated: "Duran should be told that as the only living non-Cuban who knew the full story, she was in exactly the same position as Oswald prior to the assassination. Her only chance of survival is to come clean with the whole story and cooperate fully. I think she'll crack when confronted with the details."

On 28th November, Winston Scott contacted Luis Echeverria and told him that Washington wanted the Mexicans to interrogate Gilberto Alvarado. On 29th November, Scott received a message from John M. Whitten saying: "Please continue to keep us filled in on status of interrogations of Slvia Duran, Alvarado and others implicated as fast as you can get info."

J. Edgar Hoover sent FBI agent, Larry Keenan, to Mexico City in order to have a meeting with Mann, Winston Scott, and David Atlee Phillips. Mann started the meeting by expressing the belief that Fidel Castro and the DGI were behind the assassination of John F. Kennedy and that it was just a matter of time before the United States invaded Cuba. However, Keenan replied that Hoover, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert Kennedy, all believed that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

Mann later told Dick Russell: "It surprised me so much. That was the only time it ever happened to me - We don't want to hear any more about the case - and tell the Mexican government not to do any more about it, not to do more investigating, we just want to hush it up.... I don't think the U.S. was very forthcoming about Oswald... it was the strangest experience of my life."

In reality, J. Edgar Hoover had not ruled out the possibility of a communist plot to kill John F. Kennedy. At 1.40 on 29th November, Hoover told Lyndon B. Johnson on the telephone: "This angle in Mexico is giving us a great deal of trouble because the story there is of this man Oswald getting $6,500 from the Cuban embassy and then coming back to this country with it. We're not able to prove that fact, but the information was that he was there on the 18th of September in Mexico City and we are able to prove conclusively he was in New Orleans that day. Now then they've changed the dates. The story came in changing the dates to the 28th of September and he was in Mexico City on the 28th. Now the Mexican police have again arrested this woman Duran, who is a member of the Cuban embassy... and we're going to confront her with the original informant, who saw the money pass, so he says, and we're also going to put the lie detector test on him."

That evening Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios told Winston Scott that Gilberto Alvarado had recanted and signed a statement admitting that his story of seeing Lee Harvey Oswald in the Cuban Embassy was completely false. He said his motive was to try to get the United States to take action against Fidel Castro.

A few days later Gilberto Avarado reverted to his original story. He told his Nicaraguan handler that the only reason that he recanted was that his interrogators threatened "to hang him by his testicles". However, soon afterwards, he recanted again. David Atlee Phillips later claimed that Alvarado was "dispatched to Mexico City by the Somoza brothers... in what they considered a covert action to influence the American government to move against Cuba". Jefferson Morley argues that Phillips is being disingenuous: "Phillips knew all along about Alvarado's service as a CIA informant. Even the FBI knew all along he was under CIA control."

Silvia Duran was questioned about her relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald. Despite being roughed up she denied having a sexual relationship with Oswald. Luis Echeverria believed her and she was released. However, Duran later admitted to a close friend that she had dated Oswald while he was in Mexico City.

In 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Mann as his U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and his top policymaker on Latin America. Johnson said at the time: "We expect to speak with one voice on all matters affecting this hemisphere. Mr. Mann will be that voice."

In an interview in Time Magazine Mann argued: "Our job is to convince the Latin Americans that their interests lie parallel to ours - not because of sentiment, but in their own self-interest. Democracy is a tie in these cases, economics is a tie, and Christianity is another tie. The total of these ties is where our interest lies, and when these ties are strong enough, no Marxist can separate us."

After resigning from the Department of State in 1966 he was employed by the Automobile Manufacturing Association.

Thomas Mann died in Austin on 23rd January 1999.

Primary Sources

(1) Time Magazine (31st January, 1964)

"I am a pragmatist, not a dogmatist," says Thomas Clifton Mann, "and I am not a miracle worker." Mann, 51, will need all of his pragmatism and may even have to work a few miracles if he is to succeed in his new job as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and President Johnson's top policymaker and adviser on the difficult, demanding world of Latin America.

"We expect to speak with one voice on all matters affecting this hemisphere," said Johnson when he appointed Mann last month. "Mr. Mann will be that voice." Too often in the recent past, U.S. policy toward Latin America, expressed by a babble of confused voices, has been dangerously diluted by a division of responsibilities in Washington. It now becomes Mann's task to bring order and direction to U.S. relations with an immensely important area that is crying out for change.

The "Invisible" Ones. That area is basically one of a relatively few "haves," and millions of "have nots" whose mood ranges from hopeless to revolutionary. Average per capita income is a miserable $400 a year. Since 1961, seven constitutional governments have been toppled by military coups. Nearly all of Latin America—about 8,500,000 sq. mi. and 220 million people—is teeming with unrest. The "invisible" ones, as Colombian Writer Germán Arciniegas said of the masses, may be at a point where they will make themselves heard in "a consuming fire or a flood of light." And despite jubilant receptions for President Eisenhower when he visited in 1960 and for President Kennedy in 1962, Latin America's feelings toward the U.S. are often far from cordial.

What can the U.S. do? Drawls Texan Mann: "Our job is to convince the Latin Americans that their interests lie parallel to ours—not because of sentiment, but in their own self-interest. Democracy is a tie in these cases, economics is a tie, and Christianity is another tie. The total of these ties is where our interest lies, and when these ties are strong enough, no Marxist can separate us."

(2) Thomas Mann was interviewed by Joe B. Franz on 4th November, 1968.

Joe Franz: Did you feel that he (Lyndon Johnson) played any role in your appointment to Mexico as Ambassador?

Thomas Mann: I don't know.

F:He didn't sound you out about it at that time? You just discussed the Mexican situation?

M:We did. We did not talk specifically about whether or nor I should be appointed or whether or not he was going to recommend me for an appointment, as I remember....

F: Let's go back, Mr. Mann. You went to Guatemala as counselor to the Embassy in 1955. This was right after the overthrow of the Communist-oriented regime, right?

M:Yes. Two or three weeks after. I came from Greece,

F: Did that present special problems?

M: Well, the Castillo government, the man who overthrew Arbenz, was riding the crest of popularity at that time. He had a lot of support from the people. The biggest demonstration that local people said ever took place, took place spontaneously to welcome him into the city. The problems were those of helping him organize an economic program and a social program to deal with problems of the country. We worked, during the time I was there, largely in the economic and social field.

F: Would you care to comment on whether the revolution against Arbenz was CIA - directed, inspired?

M: No, I wouldn't comment on that even if I knew, because I don't think one should. But I will say that I really don't know a great deal about the pre-revolutionary period because I was in Greece for a year while all of this was going on.

F: Is there conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department? Do they work independently of each other, or do they try to fuse their efforts?

M: You know, this is the same kind of question we were talking about a minute ago. If you have a strong Assistant Secretary or a strong Ambassador or a strong Secretary of State, there is no problem with control. It's where people abdicate their responsibility that the troubles come. I never had any trouble in controlling any bureau or embassy that I was incharge of, and that goes for the CIA. I think they're a very valuable service, and their main function is information gathering. If one were to imagine where we would be without the CIA, then I think you'd begin to see things in perspective. Of course, they're never able to publicize their successes, so people get a distorted view.

(3) Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico (2008)

Why would senior U.S. government officials, every one of whom professed to loathe Fidel Castro and more than a few of whom had countenanced conspiracies to murder him, refuse to investigate contacts between his government and the man who just killed the president with a gunshot to the head? Why would they want to prevent examination of the seemingly pregnant possibility that the pro-Castro Oswald was part of a communist plot, especially at a time when Gilberto Alvarado, vouched for by David Phillips, the chief of Cuba operations in Mexico , was still being questioned?"