European Union

European Union

The first leading politician to propose a European Union was the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand. In 1929 he published a memorandum where he advocated the establishment of a European Federal Union. He gained support from Edouard Herriot but the idea stimulated little interest and was not taken up by other political leaders.

In 1945 Jean Monnet was appointed as Planning Commissioner in France. In this post he became responsible for economic reconstruction. He began working on a scheme that he eventually proposed to Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in 1949. The Schuman Plan, as it became known, was the basis for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that was established in 1952. It was agreed that the six countries that signed the Treaty of Paris, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany, would pool its coal and steel resources.

In 1958 the European Coal and Steel Community evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC). Under the ECC attempts were made to achieve harmonization. This included measures in areas such as indirect taxation, industrial regulation, agriculture, fisheries and monetary policies. The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was introduced in 1962.

Britain made attempts to join the EEC in 1963 and 1967. This ended in failure, mainly due to the opposition of President Charles De Gaulle of France. Britain, under the leadership of Edward Heath, was finally admitted in 1973. Denmark and Ireland also joined at the same time.

In 1975, the new British prime minister, Harold Wilson decided to hold a referendum on membership of the European Economic Community. Wilson allowed his Cabinet to support both the "Yes" and "No" campaigns and this led to a bitter split in the party. The Conservative Party was also divided over this issue but the British people eventually voted to remain in the EEC.

In 1979 the EEC introduced the European Monetary System (EMS). The lost-term objective of the EMS was to achieve currency union and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), a system of semi-fixed exchange rates.

Greece joined the EEC in 1981. This was followed by Portugal (1986), Spain (1986) and the former East Germany (1990). In 1993 the organization was renamed the European Union (EU). Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995.

In January 2002 the euro becomes the sole currency within the twelve participating Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).

Primary Sources

(1) Aristide Briand, speech (7th September, 1929)

Among peoples who are geographically grouped together like the peoples of Europe there must exist a sort of federal link. It is this link which I wish to endeavour to establish. Evidently the association will act mainly in the economic sphere. That is the most pressing question. But I am sure also that from a political point of view, and from a social point of view the federal link, without infringing the sovereignty of any of the nations which might take part in such as association, could be beneficial.

(2) Aristide Briand, Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime of European Federal Union (17th May, 1930)

No one doubts today that the lack of cohesion in the grouping of the material and moral forces of Europe constitutes, practically, the most serious obstacle to the development and efficiency of all political and Juridical institutions on which it is the tendency to base the first attempts for a universal organisation of peace. The very action of the League of Nations, the responsibilities of which are the greater because it is universal might be exposed in Europe to serious obstacles if such breaking-up of territory were not offset, as soon as possible, by a bond of solidarity permitting European nations to at last become conscious of European geographical unity and to effect, within the framework of the League one of those regional understandings which the covenant formally recommended.

This means that the search for a formula of European cooperation in connection with the League of Nations, far from weakening the authority of this latter must and can only tend to strengthen it, for it is closely connected with its aims.

The European organisation contemplated could not oppose any ethnic group, on other continents or in Europe itself, outside of the League of Nations, any more than it could oppose the League of Nations.

The policy of European union to which the search for a first bond of solidarity between European Governments ought to tend, implies in fact a conception absolutely contrary to that which may have determined formerly, in Europe, the formation of customs unions tending to abolish internal customs houses in order to erect on the boundaries of the community a more rigorous barrier against States situated outside of those unions.

(3) Edouard Herriot, The United States of Europe (1930)

(1) A European understanding can be achieved only within the framework of the League of Nations, as a part of the League, and marking a stage in its development.

(2) Since the League Covenant permits regional agreements within a comment it follows 'a fortiori' that it cannot oppose the agreement of a whole continent.

(3) A European understanding must take account both of international and of national alignments.

(4) It must be open to all the nations of Europe which are willing to enter.

(5) It is rendered necessary by the laws of economic evolution by industrial amalgamations, and by the necessity of defending the European market.

(6) It must be sufficiently comprehensive to admit nations like Great Britain, which have both European and world-wide interests

(7) The nations must be represented on absolutely equal terms.

(8) It might very well seek inspiration from the form taken by the Pan-American Union, its method of procedure would be the holding of periodical conferences with a permanent secretariat.

(9) It must be flexible, prudent and patient.

(10) It must regard the suppression of tariff barriers as the end, not the beginning, of an economic organisation of Europe

(11) It can achieve stability only by a European organisation of credit

(12) Its durability will depend upon a fixed system of arbitration, disarmament, and security.

(4) Jean Monnet, memorandum to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault (4th May, 1950)

Wherever we look in the present world situation we see nothing but deadlock - whether it be the increasing acceptance of a war that is thought to be inevitable, the problem of Germany, the continuation of French recovery, the organisation of Europe, the very place of France in Europe and in the world.

From such a situation there is only one way of escape: concrete action on a limited but decisive point, bringing about on this point a fundamental change and gradually modifying the very terms of all the problems.

The continuation of France's recovery will be halted if the question of German industrial production and its competitive capacity is not rapidly solved.

Already Germany is asking to increase her production from 11 to 14 million tons. We shall refuse, but the Americans will insist. Finally, we shall state our reservations but we shall give in. At the same time, French production is levelling off or even falling.

Merely to state these facts makes it unnecessary to describe in great detail what the consequences will be: Germany expanding, German dumping on export markets; a call for the protection of French industries; the halting or camouflage of trade liberalisation; the reestablishment of prewar cartels; perhaps an orientation of German expansion towards the East, a prelude to political agreements; France fallen back into the rut of limited, protected production.

The USA do not want things to take this course. They will accept an alternative solution if it is dynamic and constructive, especially if it is proposed by France.

At the present moment, Europe can be brought to birth only by France. Only France can speak and act.

But if France does not speak and act now, what will happen? A group will form around the United States, but in order to wage the Cold War with greater force. The obvious reason is that the countries of Europe are afraid and are seeking help. Britain will draw closer and closer to the United States; Germany will develop rapidly, and we shall not be able to prevent her being rearmed. France will be trapped again in her former Malthusianism, and this will lead inevitably to her being effaced.

(5) Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-53 (12th July, 1952)

Blankenhorn handed me the letters in the cabinet room. One was a handwritten, personal letter by Robert Schuman. The other was an official covering letter for the project laid down in a memorandum which later became known as the Schuman Plan.

In essence Robert Schuman proposed to place the entire French and German production of coal and steel under a common High Authority within the framework of an organization that should be open to other European countries as well. Schuman explained that the pooling of coal and steel production would immediately provide for the first stage of a European federation, the immediate creation of a common basis for economic development, and for a comprehensive change in their development. The merger of the basic production of coal and steel and the establishment of an authority whose decisions would be binding for France, Germany, and the other member countries, would create the first firm foundations for the European federation which was indispensable for the preservation of peace.

In his personal letter to me Schuman wrote that the purpose of his proposal was not economic, but eminently political. In France there was a fear that once Germany had recovered, she would attack France. He could imagine that the corresponding fears might be present in Germany. Rearmament always showed first in an increased production of coal, iron, and steel. If an organization such as he was proposing were to be set up, it would enable each country to detect the first signs of rearmament, and would have an extraordinarily calming effect in France.

Schuman's plan corresponded entirely with the ideas I had been advocating for a long time concerning the integration of the key industries of Europe. I informed Robert Schuman at once that I accepted his proposal whole-heartedly.

(6) Robert Schuman, declaration (9th May, 1950)

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.

The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.

Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action which must be taken in the first place must concern these two countries.

With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.

The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.

The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production

on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification.

(7) Konrad Adenauer, speech (12th July, 1952)

It is my opinion and belief that the parliaments of the six European countries which will have to deal with this European Coal and Steel Community realise exactly what it is all about and that in particular they realise that the political goal, the political meaning of the European Coal and Steel Community, is infinitely larger than its economic purpose.

Something further has resulted during the negotiations, I believe that for the first time in history, certainly in the history of the last centuries, countries want to renounce part of their sovereignty, voluntarily and without compulsion, in order to transfer the sovereignty to a supranational structure.

(8) Konrad Adenauer, speech (12th July, 1952)

It is my opinion and belief that the parliaments of the six European countries which will have to deal with this European Coal and Steel Community realise exactly what it is all about and that in particular they realise that the political goal, the political meaning of the European Coal and Steel Community, is infinitely larger than its economic purpose.

Something further has resulted during the negotiations, I believe that for the first time in history, certainly in the history of the last centuries, countries want to renounce part of their sovereignty, voluntarily and without compulsion, in order to transfer the sovereignty to a supranational structure.

(9) The Treaty of Paris (18th April, 1951)

Article 1:

By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Coal and Steel Community, founded upon a common market, common objectives and common institutions.

Article 2:

The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute, in harmony with the general economy of Member States and through the establishment of a common market as provided in Article 4, to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States. . .

Article 4:

The following are recognised as incompatible with the common market for coal and steel and shall accordingly be abolished and prohibited within the Community, as provided in this Treaty:

(a) import and export duties, or charges having equivalent effect, and quantitative restrictions on the movement of products;

(b) measures or practices which discriminate between producers, between purchasers or between consumers, especially in prices and delivery terms or transport or transport rates and conditions, and measures or practices which interfere with the purchaser's free choice of supplier;

(c) subsidies or aids granted by States, or special charges imposed by States, in any form whatever;

(d) restrictive practices which tend towards the sharing or exploiting of markets.

(10) Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community at the Messina Conference (1st June 1955)

The Governments of the Federal German Republic, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands believe that the time has come to make a fresh advance towards the building of Europe. They are of the opinion that this must be achieved, first of all, in the economic field.

They consider that it is necessary to work for the establishment of a united Europe by the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies, the. creation of a common market and the progressive harmonisation of their social policies.

Such a policy seems to them indispensable if Europe is to maintain her position in the world, regain her influence and prestige and achieve a continuing increase in the standard of living of her population.

(11) Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-1953 (1966)

In my opinion the European nation states had a past but no future. This applied in the political and economic as well as in the social sphere. No single European country could guarantee a secure future to its people by its own strength. I regarded the Schuman Plan and the European Defence Community as preliminary steps to a political unification of Europe. In the EDO Treaty there was a specific provision for a controlling body, the so-called Parliamentary Assembly - incidentally the same assembly that exercised the parliamentary controlling function in the Coal and Steel Community - to examine the questions arising from the parallelism of diverse existing or future organisations for European cooperation, with a view to securing their coordination in the framework of a federal or confederate structure.

The military aspect was only one dimension of a nascent Europe, or, more rightly at first, Western Europe. If a perfect partnership was to be achieved within Western Europe, one could not stop with defence.

After twelve years of National Socialism there simply were no perfect solutions for Germany and certainly none for a divided Germany. There was very often only the policy of the lesser evil.

We were a small and very exposed country. By our own strength we could achieve nothing. We must not be a no-man's-land between East and West for then we would have friends nowhere and a dangerous neighbour in the East. Any refusal by the Federal Republic to make common cause with Europe would have been German isolationism, a dangerous escape into inactivity. There was a cherished political illusion in the Federal Republic in those years: many people believed that America was in any case tied to Europe or even to the Elbe. American patience, however, had its limits. My motto was 'Help yourself and the United States will help you'. . .

There were those in Germany who thought that for us the choice was either a policy for Europe or a policy for German unity. I considered this 'either/or' a fatal error. Nobody could explain how German unity in freedom was to be achieved without a strong and united Europe. When I say 'in freedom' I mean freedom before, during and above all after all- German elections. No policy is made with wishes alone and even less from weakness. Only when the West was strong might there be a genuine point of departure for peace negotiations to free not only the Soviet zone but all of enslaved Europe east of the iron curtain, and free it peacefully. To take the road that led into the European Community appeared to me the best service we could render the Germans in the Soviet zone.

(12) Treaty of Rome (25th March 1957)

Article 1: By the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties (Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands) establish among themselves a European Economic Community.

Article 2: It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States.

Article 3: For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Community shall include, under the conditions and with the timing provided for in this Treaty:

(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and exportation of goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect;

(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries;

(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital;

(d) the inauguration of a common agricultural policy;

(e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;

(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the Common Market;

(g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to coordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy disequilibrium in their balances of payments;

(h) the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market;

(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve the possibilities of employment for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living;

(j) the establishment of European Investment Bank intended to facilitate the economic expansion of the Community through the creation of new resources; and

(k) the association of overseas countries and territories with the Community with a view to increasing trade and to pursuing jointly their effort towards economic and social development.

(13) Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (1962)

Economic integration can take several forms that represent varying degrees of integration. These are a free-trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration. In a free trade area, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against non-members. Establishing a customs union involves, besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union, the equalisation of tariffs in trade with non-member countries. A higher form of economic integration is attained in a common market, where not only trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union, as distinct from a common market, combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree of harmonisation of national economic policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in these policies. Finally, total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the Member States.

Adopting the definition given above, the theory of economic integration will be concerned with the economic effects of integration in its various forms and with problems that arise from divergences in national monetary, fiscal, and other policies. The theory of economic integration can be regarded as a part of international economics, but it also enlarges the field of international trade theory by exploring the impact of a fusion of national market on growth and examining the need for the coordination of economic policies in a union. Finally, the theory of economic integration should, incorporate elements of location theory, too. The integration of adjacent countries amounts to the removal of artificial barriers that

obstruct continuous economic activity through national frontiers, and the ensuing relocation of production and regional agglomerative and deglomerative tendencies cannot be adequately discussed without making use of the tools of locational analysis.

(14) Jean Monnet, Prospect for a New Europe (1959)

The Community's institutions consist of a Council of Ministers, a European Economic Commission, an Assembly, which is a kind of Parliament, and a Court of Justice, which is an embryo Supreme Court. What we have is a system of checks and balances similar to that in most constitutions.

The Council of Ministers is designed to bring together national views, the views of the six governments. It meets at intervals. Each government is represented in the Council by its Foreign Minister or by one or more other Ministers, such as the Finance, Transport or Agricultural Ministers, as the subject matter requires.

The continuing, day-to-day executive work of the Community is handled by the nine-member European Economic commission. The Commission is responsible to the Assembly of the Community. It defends the common interests of the Community and represents the Community viewpoint, rather than national views. It acts by majority vote in all things.

The Commission has numerous real powers, specified in the Treaty, which it exercises on its own authority. Where general rules have to be set, the Council of Ministers makes the decisions. But it must do so on the proposals of the Commission. It cannot amend the Commission's proposals except by unanimous vote.

(15) Walter Hallstein, A New Path to Peaceful Union (1962)

What sort of government is the government which we see in embryo in the European Economic Community? It is not, as I said, a further development of normal diplomatic methods of consultation and co-operation as seen in traditional international organisations. Instead, the fusion of interests in the European Community is being achieved through a new

mechanism of institutions which it is only a slight exaggeration to call a constitutional framework.

Of course, the European Community is not just a new power-bloc or a new coalition, although it has its pride, it is not a swollen version of 19th century nationalism, taking a continent rather than a country as its basis. In fact, it is the concrete embodiment of a new approach to the relations between states. It is not merely international: it is not yet fully federal. But

it is an attempt to build on the federal pattern a democratically constituted Europe - what I have called elsewhere a federation in the making.

No practical statesman would I think be prepared to endorse unreservedly the doctrine of the separation of powers: but classical democratic theory, with its division of the organs of government into executive, legislative and judiciary, certainly underlines the constitutional structure of the European Economic Community. The Executive is the Commission - nine men, many of them former ministers in national governments, who are now no longer national, but European, responsible to the Community as a whole. They are not permitted to take national instructions, and once appointed for their term of office by common agreement of the member governments, they can only be removed by a vote of no confidence from the Community Parliament, of which I shall speak in a moment. The Commission has broadly three main tasks. First, it draws up proposals to be decided by the Council of Ministers. Secondly, it watches over the execution of the Treaty and may call firms and governments to account. Thirdly, it mediates between the governments and seeks to reconcile national interests with the Community interests; and a fourth task, whose importance is growing, is that of executing those decisions of detail which for the sake of rapid and impartial treatment it is empowered to take itself.

(16) Harold Macmillan, speech in the House of Commons (31st July 1961)

Therefore, after long and earnest consideration, Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain to make a formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty for negotiations with a view to joining the Community if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association.

If, as I earnestly hope, our offer to enter into negotiations with the European Economic Community is accepted, we shall spare no efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. These negotiations must inevitably be of a detailed and technical character, covering a very large number of the most delicate and difficult matters. They may, therefore, be protracted and there can, of course, be no guarantee of success. When any negotiations are brought to a conclusion then it will be the duty of the Government to recommend to the House what course we should pursue.

(17) Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th January 1963)

The Treaty of Rome was concluded between six continental States - States which are, economically speaking, one may say, of the same nature. Indeed, whether it be a matter of their industrial or agricultural production, their external exchanges, their habits or their commercial clientele, their living or working conditions, there is between them much more resemblance than difference. Moreover, they are adjacent, they inter-penetrate, they prolong each other through their communications. It is therefore a fact to group them and to link them in such a way that what they have to produce, to buy, to sell, to consume - well, they do produce, buy, sell, consume, in preference in their own ensemble. Doing that is conforming to realities.

Moreover, it must be added that from the point of view of their economic development, their social progress, their technical capacity, they are, in short, keeping pace. They are marching in similar fashion. It so happens, too, that there is between them no kind of political grievance, no frontier question, no rivalry in domination or power. On the contrary, they are joined in solidarity, especially and primarily, from the aspect of the consciousness they have, of defining together an important part of the sources of our civilisation; and also as concerns their security, because they are continentals and have before them one and the same menace from one extremity to the other of their territories; finally, they are in solidarity through the fact that not one among them is bound abroad by any particular political or military accord.

Thus, it was psychologically and materially possible to make an economic community of the Six, though not without difficulties. When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after long discussions; and when it was concluded, it was necessary in order to achieve something that we French put in order our economic, financial, and monetary affairs and that was done in 1959.

Thereupon Great Britain posed her candidature to the Common Market. She did it after having earlier refused to participate in the communities we are now building, as well as after creating a free trade area with six other States, and, finally, after having - I may well say it, the negotiations held at such length on this subject will be recalled - after having put some pressure on the Six to prevent a real beginning being made in the application of the Common Market. If England asks in turn to enter, but on her own conditions, this poses without doubt to each of the six States, and poses to England, problems of a very great dimension.

England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.

(18) Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memories of an European (1971)

A new political event of extreme importance was in the making: General de Gaulle had torpedoed our negotiations without having warned either his partners or the British. He had acted with a lack of consideration unexampled in the history of the EEC, showing utter contempt for his negotiating partners, allies and opponents alike. He had brought to a halt negotiations which he himself put in train in full agreement with his partners, and had done so on the flimsiest of pretexts.

What had happened? There is every reason to believe that it was the attitude adopted by Macmillan at his meeting with Kennedy in Bermuda which so upset the President of the French Republic. Macmillan's crime was to have reached agreement with the President of the United States on Britain's nuclear, weaponry. He had in fact arranged for the purchase of Polaris missiles from the United States. In General de Gaulle's eyes the cooperation with the Americans was tantamount to treason against Europe's interests and justified his refusal to allow Britain into the Common Market. The General's resentment was all the greater because a few days before the Bermuda meeting he had received Macmillan at Rambouillet. The British Prime Minister, he claimed, had told him nothing of his nuclear plans. On the other hand, de Gaulle gave Macmillan no warning that he was about to torpedo the negotiations in Brussels. I think the full truth about these events still remains to be told. The French and British versions which have been circulating in the chancelleries differ, but what is certain is that France, without consulting her partners, unilaterally withdrew from negotiations to which she had earlier agreed and that she did so, moreover, after first insisting that the Six must present a united front.

We were faced with a complete volte-face. Stunned and angry, our first reaction was to ignore what had been said in Paris and to continue the negotiation as if nothing had happened. The British showed extraordinary sang-froid. Though, deep down, they were greatly shocked, they gave no outward sign of this and continued to present their arguments at the negotiating table with imperturbable calm.

(19) Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th January 1963)

I should like to speak particularly about the objection to integration. People counter this by saying: "Why not merge the six states together into a single supranational entity? That would be very simple and practical". But such an entity is impossible to achieve in the absence in Europe today of a federator who has the necessary power, reputation and ability. Thus one has to fall back on a sort of hybrid arrangement under which the six states agree to submit to the decisions of a qualified majority. At the same time, although there are already six national Parliaments as well as the

European Parliament and, in addition the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe ... it would be necessary to elect over and above this, yet a further Parliament, described as European, which would lay down the law to the six states.

These are ideas that might appeal to certain minds but I entirely fail to see how they could be put into practice, even with six signatures at the foot of a document. Can we imagine France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg being prepared on a matter of importance to them in the national or international sphere, to do something that appeared wrong to them, merely because others had ordered them to do so? Would the peoples of France, of Germany, of Italy, of the Netherlands, of Belgium or of Luxembourg ever dream of submitting to laws passed by foreign parliamentarians if such laws ran counter to their deepest convictions? Clearly not. It is impossible nowadays for a foreign majority to impose their will on reluctant nations. It is true, perhaps, that in this 'integrated' Europe as it is called there might be no policy at all. This would simplify a great many things. Indeed, once there was no France, no Europe; once there was no policy - since one could not be imposed on each of the six states, attempts to formulate a policy would cease. But then, perhaps, these peoples would follow in the wake of some outsider who had a policy. There would, perhaps, be a federator, but he would not be European. And Europe would not be an integrated Europe but something vaster by far and, I repeat, with a federator. Perhaps to some extent it is this that at times inspires the utterances of certain advocates of European integration. If so, then it would be better to say so.

(20) George Brown, In My Way (1970)

I became the Labour Party's spokesman in the House of Commons on defence, and this got me more and more involved with European colleagues, in NATO, in the Western European Union, and in an American-European consultative body called the NATO Parliamentarians. Quite without planning I became a main spokesman for the Labour Party in all these various bodies, and I began thinking of Europe on a much wider basis than at Strasbourg. I began to think deeply about European defence, and about European and American relationships. Gradually my views changed and I became a convinced 'European'. That is something much more than being merely a Common Market man. My belief that Britain should join the Common Market developed out of my thinking on European integration. Important as it is, the Common Market in my view is only part of the wider process of creating a politically integrated Europe, capable of standing up both to the Russians and the Americans.

Geographically, historically and in every other way the British are among the leading nations of Western Europe. I have always quarrelled with Dean Acheson's much-repeated remark about Britain's having lost an empire and not found a role. We have a role; our role is to lead Europe. We are, and have been for eleven centuries since the reign of King Alfred, one of the leaders of Europe. It may be that Britain is destined to become the leader of Europe, of Western Europe in the first place, and of as much of Europe as will come together later on. The little bit of water that comes between us and the mainland is a help in the sense that it provides a point from which you can stand back and observe without getting too involved in the passions of States in the centre of the Continent, but it is no longer a barrier because wars will never again be fought in a way that makes the Channel a barrier.

(21) Edward Heath, Conservative Party election manifesto (1974)

Membership of the EEC brings us great economic advantages, but the European Community is not a matter of accountancy. There are two basic ideas behind the formation of the Common Market; first, that having nearly destroyed themselves by two great European civil wars, the European nations should make a similar war impossible in future; and, secondly, that only through unity could the western European nations recover control over their destiny - a control which they had lost after two wars, the division of Europe and the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union.

We must . . . work out with the trade unions and the employers a fair and effective policy for prices and incomes ... if after all our efforts we fail to get a comprehensive voluntary policy we shall need to support the voluntary restraint that 15 achieved with the back-up of the law. It would be irresponsible and dishonest totally to rule this out ... In the absence of an effective prices and incomes policy and Government would have to take harsher financial and economic measures than would otherwise be necessary.

(22) Michael Stewart, Foreign Secretary, interviewed by Terence Prittle about Willy Brandt (1974)

I think Brandt decided that the right way of helping us was for the Federal Republic to seek a more equal voice with France in the affairs of the Common Market, then put our case in a down-to-earth way. He had no dreams about an ideal form of European political unity. He was purely pragmatic and practical about what could be done for Europe. He was helped by the 1968 student riots in France - they actually began while Brandt and I were having talks. They made the West Germans realize they need not be quite so dutiful to the French - de Gaulle's regime was not, after all, omnipotent. German self-confidence vis-a-vis France rose as a result. This was something quite different from that terrible and disgusting German contempt in the past for the French, and it was all to the good - this was the right time for the Germans to stand up for themselves, especially with so sensible and civilized a man as Brandt to represent them.

(23) Werner Report on Economic and Monetary Union (11th October 1970)

(A) Economic and monetary union is an objective realisable in the course of the present decade provided only that the political will of the Member States to realise this objective, as solemnly declared at the Conference at the Hague, is present. The union will make it possible to ensure growth and stability within the Community and reinforce the contribution it can make to economic and monetary equilibrium in the world and make it a pillar of stability.

(B) Economic and monetary union means that the principal decisions of economic policy will be taken at Community level and therefore that the necessary powers will be transferred from the national plane to the Community plane. These transfers of responsibility and the creation of the corresponding Community institutions represent a process of fundamental political significance which entails the progressive development of political cooperation. The economic and monetary union thus appears as a leaven for the development of political union which in the long run it will be unable to do without.

(C) A monetary union implies, internally, the total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the elimination of margins of fluctuation in rates of exchange, the irrevocable fixing of parity ratios and the total liberation of movements of capital. It may be accompanied by the maintenance of national monetary symbols, but considerations of a psychological and political order militate in favour of the adoption of a single currency which would guarantee the irreversibility of the undertaking.

(D) On the institutional plane, in the final stage, two Community organs are indispensable: a centre of decision for economic policy and a Community system for the central banks. These institutions, while safeguarding their own responsibilities, must be furnished with effective powers of decision and must work together for the realisation of the same objectives. The centre of economic decision will be politically responsible to a European Parliament.

(E) Throughout the process, as progress is achieved Community instruments will be created to carry out or complete the action of the national instruments. In all fields the steps to be taken will be interdependent and will reinforce one another; in particular the development of monetary unification will have to be combined with parallel progress towards the harmonization and finally the unification of economic policies.

(24) Konni Zilliacus, Britain and the European Economic Community (1967)

Not only was the EEC launched as part of the cold war policy that had produced NATO. Its constitution, the Rome Treaty, was framed under the influence of the great cartels, combines, monopolies and holding companies which have dominated the life of the Six since the war. The Rome Treaty allows planning and even rationalization for greater economic efficiency, provided there is no interference with free competition, but rules out planning and public ownership geared to social purposes. In short, that in the EEC it is 'yes' to State capitalism and 'no' to Socialism.

(25) Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (1989)

Despite the rage in Whitehall, and the angry disappointment of most Europeans, I saw Charles de Gaulle's veto as a blessing in disguise. "The nation can no longer delude itself," I wrote, "into thinking that the painful changes in both domestic and external policy required to invigorate its flagging economy will automatically be imposed by entry into the EEC.' On the other hand, if we could meet this economic challenge, I foresaw another attempt by Britain to join the Common Market. This might come when de Gaulle had disappeared, after turning it into an organisation which might be more compatible with British interests, when Willy Brandt and the SPD held power in Western Germany, and when the other members might be ready to override opposition from Paris. So in fact it proved.

(26) Labour Party Conference (October 1972)

This Conference declares its opposition to entry to the Common Market on the terms negotiated by the Tories and calls on a future Labour Government to reverse any decision for Britain to join unless new terms have been negotiated including the abandonment of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Value Added Tax, no limitations on the freedom of a Labour Government to carry out economic plans, regional development, extension of the Public Sector, control of Capital Movements, and the preservation of the power of the British Parliament over its legislation and taxation, and, meanwhile to halt immediately the entry arrangements, including all payments to the European Communities, and participation in their Institutions, in particular the European Parliament, until such terms have been negotiated and the assent of the British electorate has been given.

(27) Campaign leaflet published during the referendum on British membership, Why You Should Vote Yes (May, 1975)

It makes good sense for our jobs and prosperity. It makes good sense for world peace. It makes good sense for the Commonwealth. It makes good sense for our children's future. Being in does not in itself solve our problems. No one pretends it could. It doesn't guarantee us a prosperous future. Only our own efforts will do that. But it offers the best framework for success, the best protection for our standard of living, the best foundation for greater prosperity. All the original six members have found that. They have done well - much better than we have - over the past 15 years. . .

Our friends want us to stay in. If we left we would not go back to the world as it was when we joined, still less to the old world of Britain's imperial heyday. The world has been changing fast. And the changes have made things more difficult and more dangerous for this country. It is a time when we need friends. What do our friends think? The old Commonwealth wants us to stay in, Australia does, Canada does. New Zealand does. The new Commonwealth wants us to stay in. Not a single one of their 34 governments wants us to leave. The United States wants us to stay in. They want a close Atlantic relationship (upon which our whole security depends) with a Europe of which we are part; but not with us alone. The other members of the European Community want us to stay in. That is why they have been flexible in the recent re-negotiations and so made possible the improved terms which have converted many former doubters. Outside, we should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with none of our friends offering to revive old partnerships.

Why can't we go it alone? To some this sounds attractive,.Mind our own business. Make our own decisions. Pull up the drawbridge. In the modern world it just is not practicable. It wasn't so even 40 or 60 years ago. The world's troubles, the world's wars inevitably dragged us in. Much better to work together to prevent them happening. Today we are even more dependent on what happens outside. Our trade, our jobs, our food, our defence cannot be wholly within our own control. That is why so much of the argument about sovereignty is a false one. It's not a matter of dry legal theory. The real test is how we can protect our own interests and exercise British influence in the world. The best way is to work with our friends and neighbours. If we came out, the Community would go on taking decisions which affect us vitally - but we should have no say in them. We would be clinging to the shadow of British sovereignty while its substance flies out of the window. The European Community does not pretend that each member nation is not different. It strikes a balance between the wish to express our own national personalities and the need for common action. All decisions of any importance must be agreed by every member. Our traditions are safe. We can work together and still stay British. The Community does not mean dull uniformity. It hasn't made the French eat German food or the Dutch drink Italian beer. Nor will it damage our British traditions and way of life. The position of the Queen is not affected. She will remain Sovereign of the United Kingdom and Head of the Commonwealth. Four of the other Community countries have monarchies of their own.

English Common Law is not affected. For a few commercial and industrial purposes there is need for Community Law. But our criminal law, trial by jury, presumption of innocence remain unaltered. So do our civil rights. Scotland, after 250 years of much closer union with England, still keeps its own legal system.

(28) Campaign leaflet published during the referendum on British membership, Why You Should Vote No (May, 1975)

Re-negotiation. The present Government, though it tried, has on its own admission failed to achieve the 'fundamental re-negotiation' it promised at the last two General Elections. All it has gained are a few concessions for Britain, some of them only temporary. The real choice before the British peoples has been scarcely altered by re-negotiation.

What did the pro-Marketers say? Before we joined the Common Market the Government forecast that we should enjoy - A rapid rise in our living standards; A trade surplus with the Common Market; Better productivity; Higher investment; More employment; Faster industrial growth. In every case the opposite is now happening, according to the Government's figures.

Our legal right to come out. It was agreed during the debates which took us into the Common Market that the British Parliament had the absolute right to repeal the European Communities Act and take us out. There is nothing in the Treaty of Rome which says a country cannot come out.

The right to rule ourselves. The fundamental question is whether or not we remain free to rule ourselves in our own way. For the British people, membership of the Common Market has already been a bad bargain. What is worse, it sets out by stages to merge Britain with France, Germany, Italy and other countries into a single nation. This will take away from us the right to rule ourselves which we have enjoyed for centuries.

Your food, your jobs, our trade. We cannot afford to remain in the Common Market because: it must mean still higher food prices. Before we joined, we could buy our food at the lowest cost from the most efficient producers in the world. Since we joined, we are no longer allowed to buy all our food where it suits us best.

Your jobs at risk. If we stay in the Common Market, a British Government can no longer prevent the drift of industry southwards and increasingly to the Continent. This is already happening.

If it went on, it would be particularly damaging to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and much of the North and West of England, which have suffered so much from unemployment already.

If we stay in the Common Market, our Government must increasingly abandon to them control over this drift of industry and employment. Far reaching powers of interference in the control of British industry, particularly iron and steel, are possessed by the Market authorities.

Interference with the oil around our shores has already been threatened by the Brussels Commission.

Huge trade deficit with Common Market. The Common Market pattern of trade was never designed to suit Britain. Taxes to keep prices up. The Common Market's dear food policy is designed to prop up inefficient farmers on the Continent by keeping food prices high.

Agriculture. It would be far better for us if we had our own national agricultural policy suited to our own country, as we had before we joined.

Commonwealth links. Our Commonwealth links are bound to be weakened much further if we stay in the Common Market. We are being forced to tax imported Commonwealth goods. And as we lose our national independence, we shall cease, in practice, to be a member of the Commonwealth.

Britain a mere province of the Common Market? The real aim of the Market is, of course, to become one single country in which Britain would be reduced to a mere province. The plan is to have a Common Market Parliament by 1978 or shortly thereafter.

What is the alternative? A far better course is open to us. If we withdraw from the Market, we could and should remain members of the wider Free Trade Area which now exists between the Common Market and the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) - Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal and Iceland. These countries are now to enjoy free entry for their industrial exports into the Common Market without having to carry the burden of the Market's dear food policy or suffer rule from Brussels. Britain already enjoys industrial free trade with these countries. If we withdrew from the Common Market, we should remain members of the wider group and enjoy, as the EFTA countries do, free or low-tariff entry into the Common Market countries without the burden of dear food or the loss of the British people's democratic rights.

(29) Alfred Gomolka, a former member of the German Democratic Republic, speech as President of the Bundesrat (15th November, 1991)

Through its unification Germany became the bearer of hope for East Europe, and precisely for this reason we must be conscious of our responsibility in connection with the integration of the East European states. That applies above all to our Polish neighbours. After a year of unity we have proved that we can live as good neighbours, that we Germans are Europeans. European Germans.

Thereby, the question arises: how, in a climate of uncertainty about the new European order, can the collapse of the compulsory associations in the East and the emergence of European Union in the West be brought into harmony. The answer lies in federalism, regionalism and in the principle of subsidiarity.

German federalism can be a very useful model for cooperation within the European Community and for the progressive integration of the European states. It has proved itself as a dynamic system, open to development and varied changes.

The 'Yes' to a federal Europe also means incorporating the Lander and regions as a 'third level' in the shaping of a political union. Crossborder cooperation between all the regions of Europe, especially in the political, economic, cultural and environmental fields is therefore a presupposition (of union). Failure to incorporate the Lander and regions into the process of European integration would mean automatically increasing centralisation of decision making and legal norms for ever more men.

The long repressed aspirations for autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe must not flow into a persistent nationalism. I see there, rather, the, perhaps necessary, first step on the way to a new European order, the first step under a common European roof.

(30) Jiri Dienstbier, Priorities of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy (1991)

What can Czechoslovakia do to ensure its security? Proceeding from our historical experiences, from our geographical situation, our vulnerability caused by a shortage of raw materials and energy and from the moral profile of our foreign policy. We have two possibilities to choose from. Either Central Europe will be fully included in conceptual considerations developing today at the most representative levels in connection with the shaping of a new European defence and security identity, or at least three Central European countries will have to start considering a closer cohesion of their security interests.

In the first case, the fact that advanced Europe includes in its defence and security identity the Central European area should be expressed by at least a minimum degree of concrete guarantees given to the states existing in this area. If we had to choose the other possibility as a result of lack of understanding of our position, i.e. the linking of our security interests with some of our former allies in the Warsaw Pact, which a certain part of the political forces in my country is in favour of, then such a solution could rather contribute to suspicion and tension in the former Soviet bloc. Quite logically the question would arise not 'why' such a solution but 'against whom' such a solution. We are naturally aware that all our efforts to fully integrate in the European integration processes lead above all through the economic sphere.

This is why after our very first foreign political step, which was the starting of negotiations with the Soviet government on the speedy withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from Czechoslovakia, we immediately made the second one which was the message the Czechoslovak Prime Minister sent to Brussels expressing our decision to become as soon as possibles full-fledged member of the European Communities.

I would like you to understand that the system which existed for more than forty years in my country was a system that was functioning, functioning badly but functioning. Only when we manage to build again an administrative and economic structure compatible with advanced Europe, only then shall we have the right to say - we are again back in Europe. And for this we need the broadest possible collaboration on the part of this advanced Europe.

It seems to me that it is easier to speak in big declarations about the need for cooperation with the states of the former Soviet bloc than to start concrete negotiations on details. We negotiated our association agreements with the EC for more than eight months. When the talks reached the final stage we suddenly realised how many conditions and restrictions were put before us. We suddenly realised that the tough rules of the market and competition were being applied everywhere where solidarity should rule in the first place. And when we eventually reached compromises on our exports of textiles, steel and meat, the extent of which absolutely cannot threaten the EC markets, we had to face another condition - either you will allow the transit across your territory of a quite unbearable number of tractor trailers or one of the twelve participants will not sign the association agreement.

Within the economic renaissance of the Central European area we have decided to follow the path of even partial projects for the implementation of which regional groupings can be set up. These are projects exceeding the boundaries of individual states and aiming at a speedier modernisation of transport, the telecommunication network and power supplies, and improvement of the environment, and created a grouping, which we call the Hexagonal and which may be renamed the Central European Initiative. To some degree we are thus creating another axis of cooperation, that of North-South, but not a new bloc.

In conceptualising our new Czechoslovak foreign policy, we clearly set out on the path leading to European integration, to those European institutions which are currently preparing and forming the basis of this integration. We have made this

choice because we regard it as the only one which can save the nations of Europe from becoming bogged down in old disputes and intolerances.