This alliance is directed exclusively against American warmongers. To be sure that is, as usual, not expressly stated in the treaty, but can be unmistakably inferred from its terms. Its exclusive purpose is to bring the elements pressing for America's entry into the war to their senses by conclusively demonstrating to them if they enter the present struggle they will automatically have to deal with the three great powers as adversaries.

In two or three minutes Mr. Roosevelt came through. "Mr. President, what's this about Japan? "It's quite true," he replied. "They have attacked us at Pearl Harbor. We are all in the same boat now."

No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured accurately the martial might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war, up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!

Yes, after Dunkirk; after the fall of France; after the horrible episode of Oran; after the threat of invasion, when, apart from the Air and the Navy, we were an almost unarmed people; after the deadly struggle of the U-boat war - the first Battle of the Atlantic, gained by a hand's-breath; after seventeen months of lonely fighting and nineteen months of my responsibility in dire stress. We had won the war. England would live; Britain would live; the Commonwealth of Nations and the Empire would live.

How long the war would last or in what fashion it would end no man could tell, nor did I at this moment care. Once again in our long Island history we should emerge, however mauled or mutilated, safe and victorious. We should not be wiped out. Our history would not come to an end. We might not even have to die as individuals. Hitler's fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to powder.

The Japanese, without any warning, yesterday afternoon began war on the United States with air attacks on the naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the adjacent city of Honolulu. Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo later announced that Japan had entered into a state of war with Britain and the United States in the Western Pacific from 6 a.m. today.

President Roosevelt has mobilized the Army and ordered all the armed forces to take up their war stations and imposed a censorship.

As more than 150 planes took part in the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Honolulu, it is thought that there must be at least three Japanese aircraft-carriers, and probably more, engaged. Several planes were shot down.

Considerable damage was done at Pearl Harbour and there were numerous casualties. It is officially announced that the Army casualties were 104 killed and 300 wounded. It is thought that these occurred when the airfield was hit. The civilian casualties are unknown.

At 3.40 on Sunday morning, December 8, 1941, Manila time, a long-distance telephone call from Washington told me of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but no details were given. It was our strongest military position in the Pacific. Its garrison was a mighty one, with America's best aircraft on strongly defended fields, adequate warning systems, anti-aircraft batteries, backed up by our Pacific Fleet. My first impression was that the Japanese might well have suffered a serious setback.

We had only one radar station operative and had to rely for air warning largely on eye and ear. At 9:30 a.m. our reconnaissance planes reported a force of enemy bombers over Lingayen Gulf heading toward Manila. Major General Lewis H. Brereton, who had complete tactical control of the Far East Air Force, immediately ordered pursuit planes up to intercept them. But the enemy bombers veered off without contact.

When this report reached me, I was still under the impression that the Japanese had suffered a setback at Pearl Harbor, and their failure to close in on me supported that belief. I therefore contemplated an air reconnaissance to the north, using bombers with fighter protection, to ascertain a true estimate of the situation and to exploit any possible weaknesses that might develop on the enemy's front. But subsequent events quickly and decisively changed my mind. I learned, to my astonishment, that the Japanese had succeeded in their Hawaiian attack, and at 11:45 a report came in of an over- powering enemy formation closing in on Clark Field. Our fighters went up to meet them, but our bombers were slow in taking off and our losses were heavy. Our force was simply too small to smash the odds against them.

Confirmation that the Japanese have completely evacuated Guadalcanal, in the Solomons, came last night in a Navy Department communiqué, which said that no opposition had been encountered by American troops in their latest advances. A great amount of Japanese equipment was taken.

Major General A. M. Patch had earlier reported officially to Admiral Halsey C-in-C. South Pacific; "Guadalcanal has been taken completely. There is no longer any vestige of Japanese forces on the island." Mr. Elmer Davis, Director of the Office of War Information, said last night that the Japanese might have got a few men off the northern end of Guadalcanal. "But I believe an over-whelming proportion have been killed," he said.

The first phase of the Solomons battle was now over. He promised that the Navy Department would release this official story as soon as possible. Some naval actions appeared to be continuing. American losses were relatively light.

Describing the fighting which won the island. Captain Miles Browning, on the staff of the naval commander-in-chief said: "There was no definite surrender. Our flanking forces closed in a pincer and a ' blot-out' occurred." He placed Japanese losses during six months at between 30.000 and 50.000. Over 1,100 Japanese planes were destroyed, he estimated, and 71 ships sunk, with 11 more probably sunk.

The Japanese News Agency last night claimed that the recent naval-air battle off Isabel Island, in the Solomons, was a "large-scale air offensive to support the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Solomons and New Guinea.'

Formidable army units, it said, succeeded in shifting to new positions under extremely difficult conditions without suffering the slightest losses. Tokyo claimed that Guadalcanal had now lost all strategic value and that with control of the waters around the group completely in Japanese hands the battle for the Solomons had become a struggle for the mastery of the air.

Clawing and crawling up the cliff went platoons that were no more than squads, and companies that were no more than large platoons. From the base of the cliffs we could pick out each man and follow him until he got hit, went to the ground or climbed to the top. Not many made the top.

As they toiled, caves, gulleys and holes opened up and the Japanese dashed out to roll grenades down on them, and sometimes to lock, body to body, in desperate wrestling matches. Knives and bayonets flashed on the hillside. I saw one man straighten and lunge to kick something that attacked his legs like a mad dog. He reached and heaved, a Japanese soldier came end over end down the hill. The machine gunners yelled encouragement.

The Marine Corps has espirit de corps it to a high degree. But when the going gets toughest, when it takes a little more drive to stay sane and to keep going, and a man is hungry and tired, then he needs more than espirit de corps. It takes conviction. Our greatest weakness is the caliber of our officers, and that, of course, is a reflection of our system of education

Tarawa was won because a few enlisted men of great courage called out simply to their comrades, 'Come on, fellows. Follow me!' And then went on, followed by men who took heart at their example, to knock out, at great sacrifice, one Jap position after another, slowly, until there were no more. Tarawa is a victory because some enlisted men, unaffected by the loss of their officers, many of whom were casualties in the first hour, became great and heroic commanders in their own right.

But with all that courage and fortitude and willingness to die on the part of some of the men, too many others lacked initiative and resourcefulness. They were not trained to understand the need for sacrifice. Too many men waited for orders - and while they waited they died. What if they had been trained not to wait for orders?"

At noon of February 11th, the Joint Chiefs met with the President to review plans for attacking Japan at the earliest practicable date, preferably with the support of heavy air assault from the Chinese mainland. Thousands of Chinese were engaged during the winter of 1943-4 in building huge landing fields for the great new B29 aeroplane, which by summer would be unloosing its destructive bomb load on the heart of

industrial Japan. These super-bombers, half as large again as the familiar Flying Fortress (B17) were beginning to come off the US assembly lines in useful numbers. The Joint Chiefshoped this new fighting aircraft, with its exceptionally long range, would be able to surmount the problem of distance and give material support to the offensive against Japan.

The general strategy was to go west through the Japanese-held islands until we were in a position to strike Japan proper. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was in command in the Central Pacific and was sending us his plans for taking some islands on the route and by-passing others. The JCS usually approved the plans, because we felt that in Washington we were too far away to judge the details of his operations.

The next day (February 12) Major-General Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff to General Douglas MacArthur, conferred with me regarding future operations in the South-west Pacific area. It appeared that MacArthur's ideas might conflict with those of Nimitz, and the difference in the personalities of these two able commanders was going to require delicate handling.

Day after day we followed the Old Man's jungle-guerrilla tactics, putting into practice his theory of the mobile fire team. The team worked wonders. Toward evening we'd make a base; then next morning fan out patrols to find the enemy as well as the site of a forward base. The Old Man would okay it, and we'd all move up to it. The next day would be the same. The Old Man led the whole battalion over the ridge. Carlson called out, "Let's sing, Onward, Christian Soldiers." We didn't care whether or not the Japs heard us. We felt good singing.

We had spent a month in the jungle, and marched one hundred and fifty miles, met the enemy daily, captured and destroyed his guns and ammunition and food and medical supplies; we reassured the command that nothing important was going on in the interior; we mapped out his exit-west route; we destroyed 'Pistol Pete,' and finally we killed officially 488 Japs, but the Seabees who went in later to bury them said we killed 700. For all this, we lost 17 men, and 17 wounded.

Most significant, though, was the demonstration of the ability of American troops, properly trained and indoctrinated, to operate independent of established supply lines in the jungle. In the thirty engagements it fought, the battalion had been surprised only twice. On the other occasions it gained complete surprise over the enemy. This fact, plus its skill in jungle fighting and its tremendous fire power, explain the low casualties we sustained in comparison to those of the enemy. The heroes of Makin Island had added another exceptional feat of arms to their history.

MacArthur was convinced that an occupation of the Philippines was essential before any major attack in force should be made on Japanese-held territory north of Luzon. The retaking of the Philippines seemed to be a matter of great interest to him. He said that he had sufficient ground and air forces for the operation and that his only additional needs were landing-craft and naval support.

Nimitz developed the Navy's plan of by-passing the Philippines and attacking Formosa. He did not see that Luzon, including Manila Bay, had advantages that were not possessed by other areas in the Philippines that could be taken for a base at less cost in lives and material. As the discussions progressed, however, the Navy Commander in the Pacific admitted that developments might indicate a necessity for occupation of the Manila area. Nimitz said that he had sufficient forces to carry out either operation. It was highly pleasing and unusual to find two commanders who were not demanding reinforcements.

Roosevelt was at his best as he tactfully steered the discussion from one point to another and narrowed down the area of disagreement between MacArthur and Nimitz. The discussion remained on a friendly basis the entire time, and in the end only a relatively minor difference remained - that of an operation to retake the Philippine capital, Manila. This was solved later, when the idea of beginning our Philippine invasion at Leyte was suggested, studied and adopted.

This is a tour of the Okinawa battlefield after the guns have fallen silent-a battlefield where many valorous young Americans fell but carried with them into eternity an even greater number of Japanese.

The jeep bumps along - moving slowly through the dust clouds to keep from running down Okinawans - past the ruined and deserted villages into the rubble heap of what was once Naha, the capital of Okinawa.

Then up the hill to Shuri Castle, where the Japanese had their headquarters until the shells and bombs pulverized the walls, five feet thick.

There was Chocolate Drop Hill, where the wreckage of 15 American tanks stopped by Japanese shells are mute monuments to the valor of the men who fell in the battle to conquer it.

It is peaceful now on Conical Hill, where the Americans fought up and were driven back and finally went up to stay.

Not far away is a cemetery where many of those who fought on Conical Hill lie buried. Helmeted soldiers are painting white crosses.

In the center of one cemetery was a low picket fence around the grave of Lieut. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commander of the U.S. Tenth Army, who fell just as final victory was in view.

The sporadic fire of Japanese snipers from distant Hill 89 reminds the visitor that men still are falling although the campaign has long since ended.

We are allowed to say quite a bit now about where we have been and what we have done. Its funny, but if wasn't the idea of getting wounded or killed that worried me. Instead, dreaded the prospect of being caught as the Japs were, with no navy to back them up, no reinforcements and absolutely no chance at all.

The time of my big fight came a week or two after we landed on Gavafu, I had dug myself a nice comfortable fox hole which was actually rain proof, mosquito proof, had a candle or two, and even a box to keep chow and water in, in case of attack. It was placed in what I figured was a safe place for a fox hole on the island and was close to our radio dugout. That night, a Sunday night, while on radio watch I copied a coded urgent message from Tulagi. There were forty thousand Jap troops on transports on their way in. Right then our commanding officer figured it was time to send a radio operator to Tanambago. Me!!! That is when that funny feeling hit my knees and the pit of my stomach! had to leave my nice fox hole and go over where I had none. If I had to fight, I at least wanted a good place to fight from. In case of attack my position was in an old Jap pillbox which stuck up right out in the open like a sore thumb, and would have been blown sky high by a three inch shell. By dawn though, felt better, for during the night while on guard I heard a rumble and saw flashes of battle way out at sea. And the Jap task force never came in!